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On September 6, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) regula-
tion' authorizing federal prosecutors to approach persons represent-
ed by counsel in certain situations became effective. 2 The Depart-
ment of Justice, through this regulation, attempts to reconcile the
American Bar Association's Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2
(MR 4.2), and its predecessor, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A) (1) (DR 7-104(A) (1)),' with
1. Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codified
at 28 C.F.R pt. 77). Section 301 of title 5 of the United States Code establishes the authority
of the Attorney General to issue regulations governing conduct of Department of Justice
employees. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
The Department initially issued a similar proposed regulation under Attorney General Barr,
57 Fed. Reg. 54,737 (proposed Nov. 20, 1992), but due to heavy criticism and the change in
Administrations, Attorney General Reno withdrew the initial regulation and resubmitted it. 58
Fed. Reg. 39,976, 39,977 (proposedJuly 26, 1993). The regulation was again withdrawn and
resubmitted on March 3, 1994, in a substantially revised form. 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086 (proposed
Mar. 3, 1994). After the final comment period, the Department ofJustice made minor changes
to the regulation and published it in its final form on August 4, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. at 39,910-31.
2. Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,928-31 (1994) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R pt. 77). Relevant sections of the final regulation are reprinted in the
Appendix to this Comment. Commentary, including the section-by-section analysis of the final
regulation, is not set out in the Appendix, but may be found id. at 39,910-28 [hereinafter
Communications with Represented Persons Commentary].
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 4.2 (1992) (Model Code
Comparison). Rule 4.2 retained almost all of the provisions contained in the predecessor to the
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the duty of federal prosecutors to investigate and enforce federal
law.4  Despite the Department's efforts to follow substantially the
language of the anti-contact rule, the regulation is beyond the scope
of the Department's statutory and constitutional authority to
circumvent the power of state and federal courts that oversee the
ethical conduct of federal attorneys. Furthermore, the Department's
regulation departs in several significant areas from the interests
protected by the ethical rule.5
The anti-contact rule, MR 4.2 and its predecessor DR 7-104(A) (1),6
mandate, in substance, that an attorney may not communicate with
a person already represented by counsel concerning the subject
matter of the representation without the other attorney's consent.7
Commentators have suggested that the model ethical rule serves
several purposes.8 Some of the compelling reasons behind the model
current anti-contact rule, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILri DR7-104(A) (1) (1982).
Id.
4. See Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.1; see also Communica-
tions with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,911 (discussing need for
uniform ethical rule). The Department actually asserts an exemption for both its civil and
criminal litigators from the application of DR 7-104. Communications with Represented
Persons, infra app., § 77.5; see also Thornburgh Memorandum, infra note 59, at 489-93 (asserting
exemption from DR 7-104(A) (1) for both civil and criminal attorneys in Department). The
justification for a civil law enforcement exemption is substantially the same for criminal law
enforcemenL Id. This Comment analyzes the application of DR 7-104(A) (1) to criminal law
enforcement only. Civil law enforcement exemption may raise additional concerns beyond the
scope of this Comment. See 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976, 39,988 (1993) (discussing commentary
submitted to Department of Justice on proposed regulation's application to federal law civil
enforcement).
5. See infra Part I1 (discussing divergence of Departmentes regulation from provisions of
ethical rule).
6. Except as otherwise noted, this Commentwill use the terms MR 4.2 and DR 7-104(A) (1)
interchangeably because many States still apply the Model Code as opposed to the Model Rules,
and because MR 4.2 and DR 7-104(A) (1) are substantially the same provision. See MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (Model Code Comparison); see also infra note 13 (discussing
history of ethical rule).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2. Rule 4.2 states: "In representing
a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." Id. Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) (1)
states:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1)
Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation
with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the
prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do
SO.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A) (1).
8. See e.g., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 4.2 cmt., at 424
(1992) (discussing purposes of model rule and listing sources supporting these purposes);
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 11.6.1 to .2 (1986) (articulating various goals
of ethical rules MR 4.2 and DR 7-104(A) (1)); John Leubsdorf, Communicating With Another's
Client: The Lanyer's Veto and the Client's lnterest 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 686-87 (1979) (outlining
purported goals of DR 7-104(A) (1)).
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ethical rule include: the protection of the attorney-client relation-
ship,9 the protection of the uncounseled client in dealing with the
trained lawyer,1" the preservation of the lawyer's ability to effectively
monitor the client's case, 1 and the ability of a lawyer to represent
his client most effectively without interference from the opposing
counsel.12
Model Rule 4.2 has a long history;i" every State has adopted the
rule in one form or another,14 as have most of the ninety-four
federal districts through local court rules. 5 Both state and federal
courts have almost uniformly applied the rule to prosecutors.
16
9. See United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (recognizing that
anti-contact rule is intended to prevent impairment of attorney-client relationship); WOLFRAM,
supra note 8, § 11.6.1 (noting that rule prevents overreaching and encroachment by opposing
lawyer).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir.) (positing that rule is
intended to prevent opposing counsel from using calculated questions to trick uncounseled
party (citing United States v.Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855
(1990); Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. at 813 (observing that anti-contact rule attempts to compensate
for uncounseled layperson's inability to manage information and lack of understanding
necessary to conduct complex legal negotiations with opposing party); WOLFRAM, supra note 8,
§ 11.6.2 (voicing danger of contact by opposing lawyer to uncounseled party).
11. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 11.6.2 (noting that requirement of "knowing"
communication prevents lawyer from sabotaging opposing party); Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at
686 (stating that DR 7-104(A) (1) shields parties from being "bamboozled" by opposing lawyers).
12. See Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. at 813 (noting that rule intends to avoid handicapping lawyer
by preventing opposing lawyer from interfering with his client); WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 11.6.2
n.31 (observing that contact between attorney's client and opposing counsel may harm attorney-
client relationship, thereby preventing attorney from providing effective services).
13. See United States v.Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (detailing history
of current MR 4.2), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983). The court observed in
Jamil that the Anglo-American bar has followed the rule from "time immemorial." Id. at 651.
The American Bar Association originally introduced the rule in the Canons of Professional
Ethics as Canon 9 in 1908. Id. at 652; see also Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications With
Defendants: WhatAre theLimitst 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 284 n.4 (1988) (discussing history of DR
7-104(A)(1)); Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 684-85 (chronicling history of rule from its first
mention in 1824 to DR 7-104(A) (1)).
14. See Green, supra note 13, at 284 (indicating that every State has adopted either MR 4.2
or DR 7-104(A) (1)).
15. SeeRand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596,601-02 (7th Cir. 1991) (detailing federal district
courts that have adopted attorney disciplinary measures through local rules).
16. See, eg., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993) (demanding that
prosecutors comply with ethical rule); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 838-40 (2d Cir.
1988) (asserting that prosecutors are subject to Model Rule 4.2, while upholding some actions
of prosecutors as authorized by law), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); United States v. Ferrara,
847 F. Supp. 964, 968-70 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that Supremacy Clause does not bar
enforcement of disciplinary action against federal prosecutor before state ethics committee),
appeaed, No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994); In reDoe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M.
1992) ("It falls to this Court to disabuse the Government of its novel self-conceived notion that
Government lawyers, unlike any other lawyer, may act unethically.");Jami4 546 F. Supp. at 652
(citing numerous federal and state cases for proposition that DR 7-104(A) (1) applies to prosecu-
tors); Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 1985) (conceding that DR 7-104(A) (1) applies
to prosecutors), cert. deniea 476 U.S. 1178 (1986); People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 452-53
(Mich. 1979) (holding that DR 7-104(A) (1) applies to prosecutors). But see State v. Richmond,
560 P.2d 41, 46 (Ariz. 1976) (asserting that DR 7-104 applies solely to civil litigation, and that
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Disagreement exists, however, over the appropriateness of state ethics
tribunals enforcing violations of the ethics provisions that occur in
federal courts. 7 Furthermore, a division of opinion remains as to
whether the prohibition on communications with represented persons
applies only after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, or
whether the prohibition extends to the investigation before the
official judicial process has begun against the individual. 8 Finally,
courts disagree about what remedy is suitable for a violation of the
anti-contact rule. Options include the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the ethical standard, dismissal of the indictment, and
reversal of the defendant's conviction. 9
The Justice Department's new regulation exempts federal prosecu-
tors from both state disciplinary proceedings and enforcement of the
ethics rule by federal courts in which the prosecutors practice. The
Attorney General may, however, authorize involvement of the state
disciplinary board.2 ' This authorization most likely would occur in
rare cases. Although the previous version of the Department's pro-
posed regulation recognized no limits on communications with
represented persons prior to the attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel,2 ' the most recent regulation recognizes a limited
law enforcement attorneys need only comply with requirements of Constitution), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977).
17. Compare Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 968-70 (holding that Supremacy Clause does not bar
enforcement in state forum of state ethics violation by federal prosecutors) andDoe 801 F. Supp.
at 484-85 (holding that because federal prosecutors must carry out duties ethically, state ethical
standards in no way inhibit prosecutors performance, and thus leave no room for Supremacy
Clause argument) with Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571,575 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Supremacy Clause bars enforcement of state ethics rule requiring judicial
authorization for subpoena of attorneys before grandjury, because state disciplinary actions may
hamper responsibilities of federal officials) and Communications with Represented Persons
Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916-17 (outlining Department of Justice's argument that
Supremacy Clause bars enforcement of ethics violations in state forum) and 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976,
39,978-80 (1993) (clarifying that in situations where conflict between state and federal rules
exists, Department ofJustice attorneys must follow federal rules).
18. Compare Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839 (refusing to limit application of DR 7-104(A) (1) to
postindictment contact with represented persons) with United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613
(5th Cir. 1993) (citing several cases for proposition that DR 7-104(A) (1) does not extend to
contacts in investigatory stages before indictment).
19. Compare Heinz, 983 F.2d at 613 (noting that no federal court has ever suppressed
evidence obtained in criminal cases in violation of DR 7-104(A) (1)) with Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464
(reserving severe remedy of case dismissal for conduct "flagrant in its disregard for the limits of
appropriate professional conduct") and United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.)
(hinting at appropriateness of complaint's dismissal where ethical violation has prejudiced
defendant's case), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1021 (1981).
20. See Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.11, 77.12 (establishing
that enforcement of violations to be conducted only by Department ofJustice, not federal courts
or state ethics tribunals). The regulation would allow state disciplinary action only when the
Attorney General finds a willful violation of the Department's regulation. Id.
21. See Communications with Represented Persons, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976, 39,983, 39,992
(1993) (28 C.F.R. § 77.5) (proposedJuly 26,1993; later withdrawn) (establishing broad authority
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respect for the attorney-client relationship prior to the attachment of
the Sixth Amendment.22
The new regulation, however, still authorizes contacts that may run
afoul of the ethical rule and undermine the protections afforded by
the rule.23 Importantly, the regulation permits communication with
a represented person after the commencement of formal proceedings
in certain circumstances.24 Critical exceptions for the purposes of
this Comment include communication with the represented person
when there is the need to investigate new or additional crimes;'
overt communication with the represented person when the person
initiates the contact;26 communication when the represented person
initiates the communication with an undercover agent;27 communica-
tion when there is danger of death or serious bodily injury to any
person;28 and communication when the represented person waives
his Sixth Amendment rights at the time of arrest.29 Furthermore,
the regulation provides for enforcement only through internal Depart-
ment of Justice disciplinary proceedings, 0 does not create any right
of enforcement in any third party,3' and does not permit the
dismissal of charges or the suppression of evidence in a matter where
a violation has occurred.32 Finally, the regulation contains an
explicit preemption provision for both inconsistent state law and local
federal court rules.33 The Department ofJustice asserts the "chilling
effect on government attorneys" caused by the conflicting state ethics
provisions and local federal court rules makes this departmental
to communicate with represented persons during investigation before attachment of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
22. See Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.8, 77.9 (outlining
restrictions on communication with represented persons where contact was made without
consent of counsel).
23. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.7; see also infra Part III
(comparing Department's proposed regulation with ethical rule).
24. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6.
25. Communications with Represented Persons, infraapp., § 77.6(e); see also infra notes 310-
12 and accompanying text.
26. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6(c); see also infra Part
III.E.1.
27. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.7, 77.9; see also infra Part
III.C.
28. Communications with Represented Persons, infraapp., § 77.6(f); see also infra notes 326-
34 and accompanying text.
29. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6(d); sea also infra Part
III.E.2.
30. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.11(a).
31. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.11(b).
32. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.11(b); see also infra Part
III.F.
33. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12; see also infra Part II.
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regulation necessary.'M The Department claims that the regulation
codifies current case law and establishes a uniform rule where the
courts are in disagreement.3 5
Model Rule 4.2 accomplishes many important goals in leveling the
playing field between the skilled attorney and the layperson.38 The
disparity between attorney and layperson exists to the same degree in
law enforcement as in civil litigation.37  On the other hand, courts
have recognized the important role played by prosecutors in the
direction of a criminal investigation, and have refused to hamper
legitimate criminal investigations." To remove the enforcement
powers from the federal courts and state disciplinary boards, however,
would exempt federal prosecutors from effective restraint in contact-
ing represented persons where the Fifth or Sixth Amendments are
inapplicable. 9 As one court has noted, "The prosecutor is a lawyer
first; a law enforcement officer second. The provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility are as applicable to him as they are to
all lawyers."'4
The application of state ethics rules to federal prosecutors has been
the subject of serious controversy." This Commentjoins that debate
by demonstrating that the Department's regulation is not the
appropriate vehicle for accomplishing the goal of providing a uniform
ethical provision. Part I outlines the development of the Department
34. See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,977; see also
Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,911 (explaining
ostensible need for Department's regulation).
35. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,911.
36. See infra notes 320-21 (citing authorities supporting this goal of MR 4.2).
37. See Green, supra note 13, at 286 n.12 (observing that ethical violation occurs by
communication in criminal context to same degree as it would in civil proceedings (citing
People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898 (N.Y. 1976))).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Our task,
accordingly, is imposing adequate safeguards without crippling law enforcement."), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 871 (1990).
39. See Jerry E. Norton, Ethics and the Attorney Genera4 74 JUDICATURE 203, 207 (1990)
(concluding that reasoning of DOJ position allows Department to "pick and choose which if any
ethical rule would apply to his office," effectively denying state agencies opportunity to regulate
federal lawyer licensed by State); Mark Ballard, ABA Notebook, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 7
(quoting ABA President R. William Ide, III as saying that DOJ regulation was "unilateral effort
to exemptJustice attorneys from the ABA's Model Rule 4.2"). But see id. at 9 (quoting Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick as stating that "Justice attorneys are [not] above law").
40. State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Kan. 1982).
41. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lisa Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 291 (1992); F. Dennis
Saylor &J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule
4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. PrTT. L. REv. 459 (1992). While these two articles deal specifically
with the issue of the application of the anti-contact rule to federal prosecutors, the entire
Volume 53, No. 2 of the University of Pittsburgh Law Review was dedicated more broadly to the
issue of the application of state ethics rules to federal prosecutors. See generally 53 U. PITT. L.
REV. 270, 270-541 (1992).
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ofJustice's current anti-contact regulation. Part II demonstrates that
the new regulation encroaches on the fundamental interest of the
States in regulating the attorneys who are licensed to practice in their
jurisdiction. Part II also suggests that the regulation infringes
unconstitutionally on the federal courts' inherent supervisory power
to control the attorneys who appear before them as officers of the
court. Part III illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the
Department ofJustice's current regulation. Part III also endeavors to
lay out an interpretation of MR 4.2 that follows the intended goals of
the rule closely, while at the same time burdening legitimate law
enforcement activities no more than a fair adherence to ethical
principles demands.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S POSITION
The Department of Justice's assertion that its attorneys should be
exempt from regulation by state code or local federal rule with
respect to confronting suspects represented by counsel originates
from an official memorandum issued during the Carter administra-
tion.42 Although there were several federal court opinions stating
that federal prosecutors were subject to federal court or state bar
ethics rules, 43 prior to 1988, no opinion took specific action to
enforce the anti-contact provisions. This lack of enforcement
probably was the reason that the Department of Justice did not
forcefully attempt to seek exemption from the ethical rule.
A. United States v. Hammad
That perspective changed, however, with the Second Circuit's
opinion in United States v. Hammad,44 which caused the Department
42. See Ethical Restraints of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility on Federal
Criminal Investigations, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 601-02 (1980) (positing that only
restraints on federal investigatory practices are those imposed by Constitution or federal statute,
and that state enforcement of DR 7-104 is barred by both Supremacy Clause and language of
Code).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding violation
of DR 7-104(A) (1), but refusing to reverse defendant's conviction), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964
(1980); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 111-12 (10th Cir.) (holding that while federal
prosecutor is subject to DR 7-104(A) (1), reversal was not warranted), cert. denied, 412 US. 932
(1973); United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th Cir.) (emphasizing that ethical
violation occurs when prosecutor conducts custodial interview of suspect in absence of counsel,
even if suspect's Fifth Amendment rights have not been violated), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947
(1970); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371,376-78 (9th Cir.) (finding that conduct of U.S.
Attorneys violated both Fifth Amendment and Canon 9 [predecessor to DR 7-14(A) (1)]), cet.
denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968). It is noteworthy that in each of these cases the Fifth or Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had also attached but no constitutional violation was found.
44. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
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of Justice to take a harder stance against the application of the anti-
contact rule to federal prosecutors.' The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendant's
motion to suppress audio recordings made in violation of DR 7-
104(A) (1).46 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the suppres-
sion of the conversations, but refused to accept the Department of
Justice's argument that DR 7-104(A) (1) did not apply to investigations
conducted before the commencement of formal adversarial proceed-
ings.47 In rejecting the argument that DR 7-104(A) (1) should be
coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Second
Circuit reasoned that the Constitution establishes only a floor of
protection below which rights of the defendant may not fall. 8
Specifically, the court noted that the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility "secures protections not contemplated by the Constitu-
tion."49  The court also refused to link the obligations of federal
prosecutors under the anti-contact rule to the beginning of the
adversarial process, expressing concern that federal law enforcement
officials might manipulate the timing of grand jury proceedings in
order to obtain the maximum amount of information from the
suspect in the absence of the suspect's attorney."
In order to avoid "handcuffing law enforcement officers in their
efforts to develop evidence,"5 the Second Circuit in Hammad took
45. See Thornburgh Memorandum, infra note 59, at 489-93 (detailing Department of
Justice's position regarding application of DR 7-104(A) (1) to federal prosecutors).
46. United States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397,400-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 834
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990). The facts of this case involved contact by the
Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) with the represented defendant before either the Fifth or Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel had attached;
In July 1986, Taiseer Hammad's attorney contacted the AUSA to inform him that he
represented Taiseer Hammad and his department store. See Hammad, 858 F.2d at 836. Despite
this knowledge, the prosecutor instructed an associate of Hammad's, who had agreed to assist
in the investigation, to telephone and record conversations with Hammad in regard to suspected
Medicaid fraud. See id. at 835-36. The AUSA provided the informer with a sham subpoena in
order to help him coax further information from Hammad. See id. On the basis of the
recorded conversations and other evidence, the grand jury subsequently returned a 45-count
indictment against Taiseer Hammad and his brother. See id. at 836.
The defendant did not argue that the conversations were recorded in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights, but rather that the prosecutor, knowing that Hammad was represented by
counsel in the investigation, contacted Hammad through the informer in violation of the
prosecutor's ethical obligations under DR 7-104(A) (1). See id. On the basis of this argument,
the district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the conversations obtained in
violation of DR 7-104(A) (1). See id. at 837.
47. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. (suggesting that because prosecutor has control over return of indictment, tying
Code's applicability to timing of indictment may cause manipulation by prosecutors).
51. Id. at 838.
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a step away from broad statements about the ethical obligations of
prosecutors.-2 The court noted that, in most situations, the use of
"legitimate investigative techniques" to collect statements from
criminal suspects in the absence of their counsel is authorized by law,
and, as a result, does not violate DR 7-104(A) (1)." Nonetheless, the
Second Circuit found that the use of an informer and a sham
subpoena were not "legitimate investigative techniques."54 The court
refused, however, to suppress the evidence because of the unsettled
nature of this area of the law,55 but explicitly noted that in proper
situations suppression is an appropriate remedy for breach of an
ethical rule. Finally, the court refused to establish a "bright-line"
test for determining when a violation of DR 7-104(A) (1) occurs,
leaving it instead for "case-by-case adjudication."57
Hammad went further than any prior decision by both establishing
the applicability of the anti-contact rule in the investigatory stages of
the judicial process, and by explicitly endorsing suppression as an
appropriate remedy. Subsequent cases have interpreted Hammad as
requiring an inquiry into the appropriateness of the prosecutor's
conduct. As was true in Hammad, those cases consider preindictment,
noncustodial contact with a represented person as "authorized by law"
unless the conduct is inappropriate or goes beyond the scope of the
prosecutor's duties.58 The Department of Justice responded to
52. Id. at 839.
53. Id. Most states have adopted verbatim the ABA's version of the Model Code or Model
Rules. Each provides for an exemption from the obligation to contact the opposing party's
counsel when it is "authorized by law" to contact the opposing party directly. Although not
applicable in this case, it is interesting to note that the Florida State Bar Association eliminated
the "authorized by law" provision when it adopted the ethics code. FLORIDA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY" Rule 4-4.2; see also infra Part IlI.A (addressing significance of this
distinction).
54. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840.
55. Id. at 842.
56. See id. at 840.
57. See id. (noting, however, that prosecutor's use of informants prior to indictmentwill not
be subject to suppression because it falls within "authorized by law" exception).
58. See, e.g., United States v. DeVillio, 983 F.2d 1185, 1192 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
prosecutors may violate anti-contact rule in preindictment phase, but failing to find conduct
egregious enough to warrant exclusion of evidence); United States v. Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp.
203, 207-10 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that prosecutor did not use "illegitimate investigative
technique[s], akin to the sham subpoena in Hammad"); United States v. Santopietro, 809 F.
Supp. 1008, 1012-14 (D. Conn. 1992) (citing lack of deceptive investigative tools as reason for
finding no violation of anti-contact rule); United States v. Harloff, 807 F. Supp. 270, 276-77
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding no violation of anti-contact rule because techniques used were not
deceptive); United States v. Buda, 718 F. Supp. 1094, 1095-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that
although prosecutor knew of contact with represented party, he did not "attempt[] to direct the
content of [the informant's] conversation with the defendant so as to beguile him into giving
his case away"); United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (concluding
that prosecutor did not engage in "egregious misconduct" sufficient to warrant suppression of
evidence).
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Hammad with what has become known as the Thornburgh Memoran-
dum.
59
B. The Thornburgh Memorandum
OnJune 8,1989 then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh issued
a memorandum to all Justice Department litigators setting forth the
Department's position regarding the impact of DR 7-104(A) (1) on
federal law enforcement.' As noted earlier, the Thornburgh
Memorandum was not the Department's first statement on the
application of the anti-contact rule to federal prosecutors. Under the
Carter administration, the Department of Justice issued an official
opinion which claimed that federal prosecutors were limited only by
the Constitution and federal statutes in carrying out their dilties.61
Citing that 1980 Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, Thornburgh
asserted that the "extent to which the Department requires its
attorneys to conform their conduct to judicial and bar association
interpretations of DR 7-104 is solely a question of policy."62
The Thornburgh Memorandum posited two main grounds for
exempting federal litigators from the application of DR 7-104(A) (1).
The Department first claimed that federal prosecutors are authorized
by law to direct and supervise undercover law enforcement efforts. 3
This included communicating with individuals who have not been
formally charged with a crime, irrespective of the representation of
the person by counsel.' 4 As previously noted, DR 7-104(A) (1) allows
attorneys to confront a person represented by counsel, without the
consent of that person's counsel, where they are authorized by law to
do so.65 The second point asserted by the Department for
prosecutors' exemption from the anti-contact rule is that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution bars the enforcement of the
ethics rule at the state or local level.66 The Memorandum concluded
by throwing down the gauntlet, asserting that "in such an instance,
59. Richard Thornburgh, Memorandum to All Justice Department Litigators Re
Communications with Persons Represented by Counsel (unpublished office memorandum,June
8, 1989) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum], in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93
(D.N.M. 1992).
60. Id.
61. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576 (1980).
62. Thomburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 491.
63. Thomburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 492.
64. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 492.
65. See supra note 53 (noting that most states have adopted "authorized by law" clause).
66. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 493 (stating Department of Justice's
intention to rely on Supremacy Clause in resisting local efforts to impede "legitimate federal law
enforcement techniques").
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that where the Constitution and federal law permit legitimate
investigative contact, DR 7-104 does not present an obstacle."67
C. United States v. Lopez and Subsequent Case Law
1. United States v. Lopez
The Thornburgh Memorandum threatened not only the inherent
supervisory power of the federal judiciary over officers of the court,
but also the ability of the States to oversee the ethical standing of the
attorneys licensed in their respective jurisdictions. It is not surprising
that some federal courts responded negatively to the Department's
position, which clearly disregarded the holdings and dicta of prior
case law. United States v. LopeY8 was the first reported case in which
a federal prosecutor used the Thornburgh Memorandum asjustifica-
tion for a violation of DR 7-104(A) (1).69 The use of the Memoran-
dum met with unfavorable reviews at both the district court and
appellate court levels. 70
The district court in Lopez flatly rejected the assertions of the
Thornburgh Memorandum.7 ' The court found no authority for the
67. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 493. The American Bar Association
House of Delegates voted in its February 1990 Midyear Meeting to reject the Thornburgh
Memorandum. See ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Report No. 301 (Feb. 12,
1990) (hereinafter ABA Report No. 301] (recommending that House of Delegates adopt
resolution condemning Thornburgh Memorandum and logic upon which it is based).
68. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended and
superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
69. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1445-50 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 989 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). The case actually dealt with
the application of State Bar of California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2-100, which was
adopted by the federal district court as a local rule. See id. at 1445-46 n.191; see also N.D. CAL.
R. 110-3. California Rule 2-100 is substantially the same as ABA Model Code of Professional
Conduct DR 7-104(A) (1). See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1444.
70. See Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1458 ("The government, on appeal, has prudently dropped its
dependence on the Thornburgh Memorandum in justifying AUSA Lyons' conduct, and has
thereby spared us the need of reiterating the district court's trenchant analysis of the inefficacy
of the Attorney General's policy statement."); Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1446 ("There are profound
flaws in the Attorney General's policy and they are demonstrated within the four corners of the
Thornburgh Memorandum.").
71. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1446. In Lopez, the defendant, indicted for drug violations,
retained the services of an attorney who informed Lopez that he refused to negotiate with the
Government because he believed that Lopez had a viable defense. See id. at 1438. Subsequently,
after talking with his co-defendant's lawyer (with the permission of Lopez's lawyer), Lopez
agreed to meet with the prosecutor in order to work out a disposition of the case. See id. at
1439-40. Lopez did not inform his attorney of the meeting with the prosecutor, and did not
retain additional counsel for the plea negotiations because he wanted to retain his counsel if
he needed to go to trial. See id. AUSA Lyons suspected that Lopez' attorney's fees were being
paid by a third party involved in the drug ring, and that Lopez or his family might be in danger
if anyone found out about the plea negotiations. See id. at 1441-42. The attorney for Lopez' co-
defendant told Lyons that Lopez was paying all his own attorney's fees, but did not want his
attorney present during the plea negotiations because Lopez was afraid his attorney would not
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proposition that DR 7-104 did not apply to federal prosecutors who
attempt to contact defendants under indictment.72 Furthermore, the
court rejected the Department's argument that the federal statutes
which authorize the investigation and prosecution of criminal
violations's were the type of exemption envisioned by the "autho-
rized by law" language of DR 7-104(A) (1).7 The court reasoned
that, absent express statutory authorization to contact represented
persons in the absence of counsel, the general enabling statutes were
insufficient authorization. 75
The Department of Justice went on, however, to claim boldly that
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers76 barred the
federal courts from enforcing their own local anti-contact rules against
federal prosecutors." The Department argued that if the federal
court enforced the ethical rule against federal prosecutors, the court
would be interfering with the inherent power of the executive branch
to carry out and enforce the law,78 a position the court flatly reject-
ed:
The government's suggestion that this court may not enforce its
Local Rules against DOJ attorneys because of some perceived
conflict with those attorneys' statutory responsibility to investigate
criminal investigations is, to put it bluntly, preposterous. DQJ
attorneys may not be exempted from the court rules which every
other attorney must obey. Like every attorney, an attorney for the
United States appears before the court in a dual role. "He is at
once an officer of the court and the agent and attorney for a client;
in the first capacity he is responsible to the Court for the manner
of his conduct of a case, i.e., his demeanor, deportment and ethical
represent him at trial if he knew Lopez was negotiating with the Government. See id. at 1442-43.
Lyons agreed to meet with Lopez, but first soughtjudicial approval for the meeting. See id.
at 1441-42. Lyons neglected to inform the court that he was told by the attorney for Lopez' co-
defendant that the fears for Lopez' life and the safety of his family were completely unfounded.
See id. at 1442. When Lopez' attorney found out about the secret meetings, he promptly filed
papers with the court to withdraw as Lopez' attorney. See id. at 1444. Lopez then filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been
violated and that AUSA Lyons had violated the ethical requirements of California Rule 2-100.
See id.
72. Id. at 1447.
73. See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing general statutes authorizing
Department ofJustice to investigate and prosecute crimes).
74. Lopez; 765 F. Supp. at 1447.
75. Id. at 1448 (citing ABA Comm. on Prof. Ethics & Grievances, Informal Op. 985 (1967)).
76. See infra notes 198-200, 218-31 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers
doctrine).
77. See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1453.
78. See id&
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conduct...."9
Despite determining that the Government's conduct was "flagrant
and egregious," and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
withdrawal of his attorney,0 the district court found that the
misconduct did not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment viola-
tion.8' Nonetheless, applying the court's inherent supervisory
powers, the district court decided that the indictment against Lopez
should be dismissed based on the violation of DR 7-104(A) (1).82
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted much of the district court's
reasoning, but vacated the lower court's order dismissing the
indictment against Lopez. 3 The court of appeals held that, despite
the prosecutor's misconduct, the extreme remedy of dismissal was not
appropriate.8 4 The court refused, however, to rule out dismissal as
an option to remedy prosecutorial misconduct,' narrowing the
lower court's holding by requiring that "the government's conduct
must have caused substantial prejudice to the defendant and been
flagrant in its disregard for the limits of appropriate professional
conduct."" Furthermore, despite the Ninth Circuit's broad state-
ments about the duty of prosecutors to avoid contact with indicted
individuals represented by counsel, the court refused to extend the
application of the anti-contact rule to the preindictment, noncustodial
setting.8 7
2. In re Doe and United States v. Ferrara
While Hammad and Lopez involved a violation of the anti-contact
79. See id. at 1453-54 (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 n.5 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied; 434 U.S. 825 (1977)). The court in Lopez noted that "the entire post-indictment
conduct of a prosecutor is driven by the goal of completing the prosecution," and, therefore,
in essence, the Department's argument would effectively exempt prosecutors from all
supervision by the courts. Id. at 1447.
80. Id. at 1461.
81. Id. at 1456.
82. Id. at 1463. Having analyzed several less dramatic options, the court reasoned that
"none of these alternative remedies would in any way deter government attorneys from
continuing to pursue the dictates of the Thornburgh Memorandum and thus engaging in
prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at 1461.
83. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1461; see also United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging
holding of Lopez, but refusing to extend its application to preindictment, noncustodial setting
(citing United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981))). In Powe, the prosecutor
had promised to direct all interviews through Powe's attorney. See id. at 70. The government
attorney, however, directed an undercover agent to record conversations with Powe. See id. at
69. The court reasoned that the prosecutor did not promise to forego undercover investigation
merely by promising to direct all interviews through Powe's attorney. Id. at 70.
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rule in federal court, the propriety of state disciplinary actions against
federal prosecutors for violating DR 7-104(A) (1) was first explicitly
addressed in two related cases.' In the case of In re Doe,9 an
Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) attempted to remove his New Mexico
state disciplinary action to federal court under the federal statute
authorizing federal officers sued in state court for state criminal or
civil violations to have their case heard in federal court.9" The U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico refused to allow the
removal, holding that ethics disciplinary actions were not among the
criminal or civil proceedings contemplated by Congress when it
enacted the statute.91
Among Doe's many arguments was that the New Mexico ethics
tribunal was barred from proceeding against him by the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.92 The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the Justice Department policy put forth in the
Thornburgh Memorandum did not constitute federal law for the
purposes of preempting state law.9" Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that the interpretation and enforcement of ethics rules could
not be left to the very body that is governed by the rules.94
Following the court's refusal to remove the action against Doe from
the state disciplinary board to federal court, the United States filed a
request for an injunction against the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of New Mexico.95 The
United States requested that U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia enjoin the inquiry by the New Mexico state ethics commit-
tee into Doe's actions as a federal prosecutor. 6
88. See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992); United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp.
964 (D.D.C. 1993), appealed, No. 9--5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994); see also Lopez, 4 F.3d
at 1464. In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that possible options to remedy misconduct
before federal courts included referral to the appropriate state bar ethics tribunal for
disciplinary proceedings. Id.
89. 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992).
90. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D.N.M. 1992). After a federal judge found that Doe
had violated DR 7-104(A) (1) in the course of prosecuting a case on behalf of the Department
of Justice, she referred the case to the D.C. Disciplinary Board, which in turn referred the
matter to the Disciplinary Board of New Mexico, where Doe was licensed to practice. See id. at
480-81. Doe attempted the removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1988). See id. at 481.
91. Id. at 482-83.
92. See id. at 484-86.
93. Id. at 487.
94. Id. at 486 ("The idea of placing the discretion for a rule's interpretation and
enforcement solely in the hands of those governed by it not only renders the rule meaningless,
but the notion of such an idea coming from the country's highest law enforcement official
displays an arrogant disregard for and irresponsibly undermines ethics in the legal profession.").
95. See United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1993), appealed, No. 93-5233 (D.C.
Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994).
96. Id. at 965.
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The D.C. district court dismissed the case, relying primarily on a
lack of personal jurisdiction over Virginia Ferrara, a New Mexico
official.97 The district court rejected in its alternative holding Doe's
Supremacy Clause argument on three grounds. First, the court
reasoned that the Thornburgh Memorandum did not preempt state
law because it was only a policy statement of the Department of
Justice, not federal law. Second, under the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunity, the state law must give way only when the duties of
the federal officer are "necessary and proper" to the exercise of the
officer's duties;99 the court concluded that a violation of the state
anti-contact rule was simply not necessary to the prosecution of the
criminal defendant." Finally, the court reasoned that even if it
were necessary for a federal prosecutor to have ex parte contacts with
the criminal defendant, "Congress. .. clearly contemplated compli-
ance with State bar ethical standards by attorneys practicing in the
Department of Justice."101
The United States has appealed the holding of the D.C. district
court to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on both the
jurisdictional and Supremacy Clause grounds."' The briefs focus
primarily on the issue of whether the D.C. district court has personal
jurisdiction to enjoin the disciplinary officer for the State of New
Mexico because this was the primary reason for the district court's
dismissal of the case.103  Both parties also address in significant
detail the issue of the power of New Mexico to investigate Doe for a
97. Id. at 967-68.
98. Id. at 969.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 969-70. There is one other reported case that deals with the application of state
ethics proceedings against federal prosecutors. In re Gorence, 810 F. Supp. 1234 (D.N.M. 1992).
Relying on Do4 the court in Gorence refused to allow the AUSA to remove his state disciplinary
action to federal court. Id. at 1238. The court in Gorence also relied on the fact that the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have refused to review state disciplinary proceedings.
Id.
The court in Gorence observed "that something more than mere black letter law is under
scrutiny when a court describes a State rule of professional conduct as a 'fundamental
principle.' ... [Olur society, through the legal system, has decided that it is good public policy
to make all attorneys uniformly subject to the applicable state code of professional conduct."
Id.
102. United States v. Ferrara, No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994).
103. See Brief for Appellant United States at 18-31, United States v. Ferrara, No. 93-5233
(D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant] (laying out jurisdictional
argument of United States); Brief for Appellee Ferrara at 8-28, United States v. Ferrara, No. 93-
5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee] (laying out Ferrara's
argument that D.C. district court lacked personal jurisdiction); see also Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at
968 (relying primarily on lack of personal jurisdiction to dismiss case).
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violation of New Mexico's anti-contact rule."M While the outcome
of this appeal will no doubt have a substantial impact on the way in
which these issues are viewed in other circuits, the D.C. Circuit is not
directly faced with the validity of the new Department of Justice
regulation because the conduct of Doe occurred before the Depart-
ment's policy was clearly established. 5 Moreover, because Ferrara
dealt with the authority of the state ethics tribunal to discipline a
federal prosecutor, the issue of the authority of the federal court to
discipline federal attorneys for a violation of the anti-contact rule is
not before the court.
D. The Department ofJustice's Regulation Regarding
Communications with Represented Persons
As asserted in the Thornburgh Memorandum,' and in response
to the heavy criticism of the Justice Department's internal policy,"07
in late 1992 the Department ofJustice published a regulation, govern-
ing all Justice Department litigators in their communications with
persons represented by counsel. 08 Given the change in Administra-
tions, and the importance of the issue, the regulation was resubmitted
104. BriefforAppellant, supranote 103, at 32-48; BriefforAppellee, supranote 103, at 28-40;
see also Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 968-69 (finding that even if court had personal jurisdiction, case
should be dismissed because New Mexico was not barred from proceeding against Doe).
Appellee also raises two other grounds, not addressed by the district court, which could be used
by the D.C. Circuit to avoid the anti-contact rule issue. In particular, Appellee contends that
the United States is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from litigating the issue of the
anti-contact rule because that issue had been fully litigated in this case in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp.
478 (D.N.M. 1992). Brief for Appellee, supra note 103, at 40-44; see also Reply Brief for
Appellant at 19-23, United States v. Ferrara, No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994); Reply
Brief for Appellee at -10, United States v. Ferrara, No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994).
Alternatively, Appellee argues that the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), prevents the federal court from intervening with ongoing statejudicial proceedings. See
Brief for Appellee, supra note 103, at 44-46; Reply Brief for Appellant, supra, at 23-29; Reply Brief
for Appellee, supra, at 10-15.
105. Brief for Appellant, supra note 103, at 4 n.2 (noting that "the validity of the new
Departmental policy is not now before this Court because it did not govern the conduct at
issue").
106. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 493 (announcing intention to codify
policy set out in Thornburgh Memorandum in Code of Federal Regulations).
107. See, e.g., Cramton & Udell, supra note 41, at 357-59 (proposing broader interpretation
of anti-contact rule than that put forth in Department ofJustice's policy); Bennett L. Gersham,
The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PrrT. L REv. 393, 448 (1992) (claiming that Department's policy has
"disturbing" consequences for application of ethics principles to federal, as well as state,
prosecutors). But see Saylor & Wilson, supra note 41, at 487 (asserting that application of MR
4.2 has caused "much uncertainty and mischief in law enforcement, and few, if any, benefits to
the criminal justice system").
108. Communications with Represented Persons, 57 Fed. Reg. 54,737 (1992) (proposed Nov.
20, 1992).
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for further comment on July 26, 1993.1' In this resubmission, the
Department responded to comments received on the Department's
original proposed policy."' Due in large part to the strong criticism
of the Department's position, the proposed regulation was once again
withdrawn for further considerationm and a new proposed regula-
tion was published on March 3, 1994.112 This version of the
Department's position on communications with represented persons
appeared to be a substantial shift away from earlier versions." 3
The language in the March 1994 proposal was notably more
deferential to state ethics rules.114  The proposed regulation also
took significant steps toward accommodating the critics of the earlier
versions.115 After yet another comment period, the Department of
Justice published the final regulation on August 4, 1994.116 This
regulation is substantially the same as the proposal from March.17
Despite these changes and the cogent analysis put forth by the
Department on many of the issues surrounding DR 7-104(A) (1), the
newly promulgated regulation falls short of accomplishing many of
the goals of DR 7-104(A) (1). Furthermore, the fundamental defect
in the Department's position-regulation of federal prosecutors by
109. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21; see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, 2 THE HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 4.2:101 (2d ed. 1993) (delineating history and criticism of initial promulgation of DOJ's
position on MR 4.2 up to withdrawal of proposed regulation under Clinton administration);
Meetings Seek Solutions for Prosecutorial Contacts, ABA/BNA LA WERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr, Oct. 20, 1993, at 301,301-02 [hereinafter SolutionsforProsecutorial Contacts] (observing
that initial publication of regulation was withdrawn and resubmitted due to change in
Administrations, and in order to afford further opportunity for comment).
110. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,977.
111. See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086, 10,086 (proposed
Mar. 3, 1994) (noting that further comments were being solicited on prior rule because of
substantial discussion generated by regulation).
112. Id.
113. Compare Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.7 to .9
(recognizing restrictions on contact with represented persons in investigative stages) with
Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,992 (28 C.F.R. § 77.5; later
withdrawn) (recognizing no limitations on contact with represented persons in investigative
stages).
114. Compare Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12 (allowing state
disciplinary proceedings with approval of U.S. Attorney General) with Communications with
Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,994 (28 C.F.R. §§ 77.15 to .16; later withdrawn)
(recognizing no role for States in disciplining federal prosecutors who violate anti-contact
regulation).
115. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,912. The
commentary to the proposal that immediately preceded the final regulation claimed: "This new
proposal is the product of extensive review, comments and vigorous debate among judges,
federal government attorneys, members of the private bar, disciplinary officials, academics and
ethicists." Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,086.
116. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2. The regulation
became effective on September 6, 1994.
117. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,910.
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the Department of Justice instead of by state tribunals and federal
courts-remains unchanged." 8 Finally, the new regulation suffers
from the fatal flaw of holding federal prosecutors to a different
ethical standard than state prosecutors and private attorneys. 1 9
One court has noted that "[t] here is unanimous and fully document-
ed authority for the proposition that prosecutors are no less subject
to the prohibition against communication with a represented person
than are members of the private bar."1 20
The interpretation and application of the anti-contact rule has
caused substantial debate.121  The next sections of this Comment
analyze the defects in the Department's position, and propose an
interpretation of the anti-contact rule that protects the goals of the
rule without substantially hindering legitimate law enforcement
techniques.
118. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.11 to .12 (giving U.S.
Attorney General exclusive authority to decide if anti-contact regulation has been violated and
if state disciplinary action is appropriate). But see Communications with Represented Persons
Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,915 ("One individual and a number of organizations, including
the Conference of ChiefJustices, posited that the Department is acting outside the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority....").
119. See Elkan Abramowitz & Fredrick H. Saal, Can We Talk? The Need to Reform DR 7-
104(A)(1), N.Y. LJ., May 4, 1993, at 3, 10 (noting that "the Justice Department appears to have
unilaterally redefined the contours of DR 7-104(A) (1) and created a situation where government
attorneys are immune from the rule while their adversaries-members of the criminal defense
bar-are bound by it and thus fundamentally disadvantaged"); Norton, supra note 39, at 207
(positing that state prosecutors may be treated differently than federal prosecutors).
120. United States v.Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing extensive federal
and state case law and ethics opinions), revd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983). In
fact, however, the authority for the proposition that DR 7-104 applies to criminal as well as civil
attorneys is not unanimous. The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Richmond explicitly rejected
the contention that DR 7-104(A) (1) applied in the criminal context. State v. Richmond, 560
P.2d 41, 46 (Ariz. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); see also H. Richard Uviller, Evidencefrom
the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restrain4 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1178 (1987) (positing that DR 7-104(A) (1)'s application to prosecutors
is not universally accepted). It is interesting to note that Uviller cites United States v. Vasquez,
675 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1982), for the proposition that application of DR 7-104 is not universally
accepted in the criminal context. Uviller, supra, at 1178. Uviller, however, emphasizes the
wrong portion of that case. Id. The court in Vasque did not question the application of DR 7-
104 to federal prosecutors in all situations, only in "criminal investigations." Vasquez, 675 F.2d at
17 (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g.,Jami4 546 F. Supp. at 651-61 (laying out detailed and cogent analysis of trouble
spots in interpretation of anti-contact rule's application to federal prosecutors); Cramton &
Udell, supra note 41, at 333-59 (analyzing various facets of ethical provision); Saylor & Wilson,
supra note 41, at 459-87 (examining purposes and scope of rule); Marc A. Schwartz, Comment,
Prosecutorial Investigations and DR 7-104(A)(1), 89 COLUM. L. REv. 940, 940-57 (1989) (exploring
reasons why DR 7-104(A) (1) should not be applied to prosecutors).
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II. APPLICATION OF STATE AND LOCAL FEDERAL ETHICS RULES TO
PROSECUTORS
A. State Ethics Rules and the Supremacy Clause
The Department ofJustice's stance toward state ethics requirements
generally misconceives the concepts of federalism and the interests of
the States in regulating the conduct of the attorneys whom they
license. The Supremacy Clause122 ostensibly provides the basis for
the exemption of federal prosecutors from the enforcement of state
ethics inquiries according to the Department of Justice. 2  The
Department justifies its own promulgation of the regulation by
contending that the requirements imposed by state law vary widely
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and are often ambiguous in their
interpretation.2 4  This, however, does not cause as grave a problem
as the Department insinuates because the court is "entitled ... to
charge [an attorney] with the knowledge of and the duty to conform
to the State code of professional responsibility.""z One benefit of
the Justice Department's regulation, of course, is that it provides a
uniform, clear rule by which all federal prosecutors can guide their
investigations. 2 ' This benefit, however, is outweighed by the fact
that the regulation does not sufficiently address the important goals
sought to be accomplished by DR 7-104(A) (1). Specifically, if the
regulation does preempt state and local ethics standards, it would not
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
123. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916.
124. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,911;
see also Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,977.
125. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985); see also id. (stating that prerequisite for
admission to federal court is admission to state court, and, therefore, federal courts may rely on
an attorney's knowledge of state ethics rules). It is questionable whether widespread divergence
exists between the States. See William W. Taylor, I, Justice's Ethics: Bad Policy Redux, NJ. LJ.,
Mar. 14, 1994, at 17 (observing that "[ t] here is no crazy-quilt quality to application of the model
rule, and certainly not to its application to federal prosecutors"). Taylor continues:
Moreover, ambiguity is a fact of life for criminal lawyers. All attorneys are
responsible for knowing the rules of the courts in which they practice, and sometimes
their conduct is not subject to clear rules. Why should federal prosecutors be
different? If absolute uniformity in ethics justifies [DOJ's position], what would stop
the department from exempting itself from any other rules that are not the same in
all jurisdictions?
Id.
126. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at39,911 (citing
as one reason for rule that having federal attorneys subject to different ethical standards in
different States caused uncertainty).
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leave any room for the ethics boards of different jurisdictions to
address the problems which they feel need to be addressed in that
jurisdiction." 7
Although, in an earlier version of the regulation, the Department
conceded the importance of the States in regulating federal prosecu-
tors,128 the final regulation has virtually eliminated any role for the
States in regulating contact by federal prosecutors with represented
persons.129 The Department's position on the importance of States
in regulating the ethical conduct of federal prosecutors is neatly
summed up in language found in the most recent version of the
regulation but not contained in previous versions of the regulation
commentary. The Department currently maintains that "an important
feature of this regulation is its express intention to preempt and
supersede the operation of state and local federal court rules as they
relate to contacts by Department attorneys, regardless of whether such
rules are inconsistent with this regulation."' Furthermore, despite
the fact that the Department claims that federal "attorneys are subject
to the bar rules and disciplinary proceedings of the states in which
they are licensed to practice, " "' the decision to allow state ethics
proceedings against a federal attorney now lies with the U.S. Attorney
General."' By vesting the Attorney General with the power to
determine when willful violations of the anti-contact provision have
127. See, e.g., Florida State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-4 (July 15,
1990), available in Westaw, 1990 WL 446959, at *2 (specifically rejecting exemption from anti-
contact rule for federal attorneys). The comments following Rule 4.2 of the District of
Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule, on the other hand, explicitly exempt the law
enforcement activities of the United States and the District of Columbia from the rule's
coverage. D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 4.2 cmt. 8 (1991). This rule sets out a
clear exemption for these law enforcement officials, addressing the concern that prosecutors will
be hampered by ABA Model Rule 4.2.
This divergence in concepts of legal ethics is the very engine of federalism, allowing different
States to experiment in order to discover the best system to fit the conditions that confront their
citizens. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . ").
128. Communications with Represented Persons, supranote 111, at 10,088 (noting that state
courts "continue to play a primary role in regulating the conduct of all attorneys, including
those who work for the federal government").
129. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,912
(stating that DOJ "must be the final arbiter of the scope of policing with respect to ex parte
contacts involving federal prosecutors").
130. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916. The
Department reiterated its proposition that it has the ability to exempt federal attorneys from
state ethics rules. Id. at 39,911. Recognizing the widespread acceptance of the anti-contact rule,
however, the commentary to an earlier version of the regulation noted that "the Department
has decided not to implement a wholesale exemption" from the anti-contact rules. Communica-
tions with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,088.
131. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,912.
132. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12.
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occurred, the Department has implicitly rejected the position of the
Special Committee of the Conference of Chief Justices "that it is the
exclusive province of the state supreme courts to construe state
disciplinary rules."'3 3
The U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to comment on the
importance of state professional ethics rules in Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n." In that opinion, the Court
observed that the 'judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon
professionally ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant
interest in assuring and maintaining high standards of conduct of
attorneys engaged in practice. The State's interest in the professional
conduct of attorneys involved in the administration of criminal justice
is of special importance."' 5  The Court held that so long as the
state ethics process affords an attorney the opportunity to have
constitutional concerns heard, the "'National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.'"'3 6 In addition, States are
not limited to regulating the ethical conduct of private attorneys.3 7
"It is well settled that the regulation of the legal profession is a proper
exercise of state power.... That power includes the authority to
regulate the conduct of federal prosecutors."138
In view of the importance of state regulation of attorney conduct,
the cases cited by the Department of Justice in support of its
133. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916.
134. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
135. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982)
(citations omitted). In In re Snyder, the Court observed, "As an officer of the court, a member
of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members
of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers." In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644
(1985). Because attorneys hold such a position, the "States undoubtedly have the 'authority to
define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice
in its courts.'" Almond v. United States Court, 852 F. Supp. 78, 89 n.13 (D.N.H. 1994) (quoting
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986)).
136. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 431 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44 (1971)). Middlesex County Ethics Committee dealt with disciplinary action against a state
attorney. Id. at 427. The attorney claimed that the state disciplinary proceedings did not afford
him a meaningful opportunity to address his constitutional claims. Id. at 429. Extending an
earlier precedent established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held
that "[w]here vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain 'unless state law
clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.'" Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457
U.S. at 432 (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979)). The Court stressed the
significance of the state interest in regulating members of the bar several times in the opinion,
characterizing the interest as an "important state obligation," id., "an extremely important
interest," id. at 434, and an interest "of special importance." Id.
137. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117,126 (D. Mass. 1986) (citations omitted), affld
by equally divided court, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
138. Id.
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Supremacy Clause argument are inapposite. 3 9  In response to
comments submitted on a previous draft, the Department of Justice
maintained that the States need explicit authorization from Congress
to police the ethical behavior of federal attorneys who are licensed by
the States."4 Although the commentary to the previous regulation
was more deferential to the role of the States,14 ' the Department
currently maintains that the extent to which the anti-contact rule
applies to federal attorneys is "a policy question."' More impor-
tantly, the regulation prohibits States from enforcing their version of
the anti-contact rule unless the U.S. Attorney General finds that the
federal prosecutor willfully violated the Department's regulation. 143
Where a state ethics rule conflicts with the Department's regula-
tion,"4  or where the Attorney General does not find a willful
violation of the Department's regulation (even if the state disciplinary
board would have)," the States are prohibited from fulfilling "the
important state obligation to regulate persons who are authorized to
practice law."' 46 In fact, the Department explicitly recognizes that
its current regulation is intended to "state in more express terms" the
Department's position on preemption of state ethics provisions.
147
The Department's position mischaracterizes the application of the
Supremacy Clause to the States. The doctrine of preemption requires
that where "'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility,""" or when state law "'stands as an obstacle
139. See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,979 (laying out
Department'sjustification for exemption from state ethics rules). The Department, for example,
cites Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879), for the proposition that a federal officer may not
be brought to justice in a state court for an offense against a state law. Communications with
Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,979. That case, however, dealt more exactly with the
constitutionality and applicability of an explicit statutory provision allowing federal revenue
officers to remove to federal court an action brought against them in state court. Davis, 100
U.S. at 261.
140. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,980.
141. Compare Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,088
(recognizing prevalence of anti-contact rule in state ethics codes) with Communications with
Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916 (asserting that States have no power
to interfere with duties of federal attorneys unless Attorney General first finds willful violation
of rules) and id. at 39,979-80 and Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 493 ("The
Department will resist, on Supremacy Clause grounds, local attempts to curb legitimate federal
law enforcement techniques.").
142. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,911.
143. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12.
144. Communicationswith Represented Persons, infraapp., § 77.12; seealso Communications
with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916.
145. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12.
146. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,432-33 (1982).
147. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,916.
148. Hillborough County v. Automated Medical Lab, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
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to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress," 149 the state law must give way. The U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico observed in In re
Gorence"5' that there is no conflict between the state ethics rule and
the duties of the federal prosecutor because the prosecutor "retains
a duty to investigate crimes in a manner entirely consistent with the
State rules of professional conduct."''
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has required that Congress
provide a "clear and manifest" intent to preempt state law in an area
"traditionally occupied" by state regulation." 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have repeatedly emphasized that the
promulgation of ethics rules for members of a state bar is a funda-
mental state interest. 15' Every attorney in the Department of Justice
is required by statute to be duly licensed in at least one State in the
Union, evidencing Congress' acknowledgement of the predominance
of the States in the area of attorney regulation.'54 There is, howev-
er, even more direct evidence that Congress has intended to have
federal prosecutors governed by state ethics provisions. In 1990, the
House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and
Agriculture held hearings on the Thornburgh Memorandum and
other attempts by the Department ofJustice to circumvent state ethics
149. I& (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
150. 810 F. Supp. 1234 (D.N.M. 1992).
151. In re Gorence, 810 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D.N.M. 1992); see also United States v. Ferrara,
847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting argument that federal prosecutor's duties
conflicted with state anti-contact rule), appealed, No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994).
The court in Ferrara reasoned that a violation of the anti-contact rule was not "necessary and
proper" to the performance of the prosecutor's federal duties. Id. The court found that there
was no showing that the prosecutor was prohibited from fulfilling his duties without violating
the state anti-contact rule, and, therefore, the Supremacy Clause did not bar the application of
the State ethics rule. Id.
152. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
153. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434-35
(1982) ("The State's interest in the professional conduct of attorneys involved in the
administration of criminal justice is of special importance."). As recognized by one district
judge:
"Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been
left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective
jurisdictions. The States prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the
standards of professional conduct. They are also responsible for the discipline of
lawyers."
In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 484 (D.N.M. 1992) (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979)
(per curiam)).
154. Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L No.
96-132, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 1040, 1044 (1979). Analyzing the Appropriation Act, the court in Ferrara
stated that "Congress... clearly contemplated compliance with State bar ethical standards by
attorneys practicing in the Department ofJustice." Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 969.
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rules.1 55 After considering arguments on both sides, the Subcom-
mittee concluded, "We disagree with the Attorney General's attempts
to exempt departmental attorneys from compliance with the ethical
requirements adopted by the State bars to which they belong and in
the rules before the Federal courts before which they appear."5 '
The Subcommittee went on to observe that "we are not persuaded of
a need to exempt Departmental attorneys from Model Rule 4.2 as
adopted by State bars and Federal courts."157 Finally, the Subcom-
mittee "urge[d] reconsideration and withdrawal of the Attorney
General'sJune 8, 1989 memorandum, 'Communications with Persons
Represented by Counsel.'" 158 In light of the findings and recom-
mendations of the Subcommittee, Congress carried forward the Act
requiring Department attorneys to be licensed in a State without
change.1
59
Congress' general authority to preempt state ethics rules is not in
question."6 Nor is it disputed that regulations promulgated by
federal agencies have the same force as congressional statutes for
purposes of preempting state law.' The Supreme Court has
established a two-prong test for determining if federal regulations
preempt state law.' 62  First, the state law must conflict with or
frustrate the purposes of the federal regulation.16  Second, the
regulation must be within the agency's congressionally delegated authority
64
155. SUBCOMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE, AND AGRICULTURE, COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Federal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal Environment: More
Attention Require4 H.R. REP. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
986).
156. Id. at 32.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-132, § 3 (a), 93 Stat. 1040,1044 (1979) (requiring licensing of Department ofJustice attorneys
in one or more States or territories of United States). The Act was carried forward by the
Department ofJustice and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1994, Pub. L No. 103-121, 107
Stat. 1153, 1163 (1993).
160. See Sperry v. Florida ex rel Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384-85, 403-04 (1963) (holding
that federal statute authorizing nonattorneys to practice before federal Patent Office supersedes
state ethics rule prohibiting unauthorized practice of law).
161. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (recognizing that Supremacy
Clause includes both "federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are properly
adopted in accordance with statutory authorization"); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (recognizing that federal regulations may preempt state law where federal
agency is acting within scope of its statutory authority).
162. City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir. 1994)
(noting that "state law can be preempted by regulations promulgated by federal agencies acting
within the scope of their congressionally delegated authority as well as by federal legislation") (emphasis
added).
As explained by the Supreme Court, the proper focus is not on whether there was "'express
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Even if the Department ofJustice's anti-contact regulation satisfies
the first prong of the test," it fails the second, as the authority has
not been congressionally delegated. The general statutory authority
of the Department of Justice to promulgate regulations governing
conduct of its employees 166 does not entitle the Department to
override the States' fundamental interest in regulating the attorneys
who they have licensed, especially where Congress has left the
licensing and regulation of federal government attorneys to the
States. 167
The Department of Justice asserts that the promulgation of a
federal regulation will provide the "clear and manifest" intent
necessary to preempt state disciplinary actions.168  While the
Department's intent to preempt state law is clear, the Department's
regulation is outside the scope of authority granted to the Executive
Branch by the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes and, therefore,
cannot supersede state law." 9 Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause
argument put forth by the Department of Justice interferes with the
inherent power of federal courts to supervise attorneys1 70 because
many federal courts consider exclusion of evidence, dismissal of an
indictment, and reversal of a conviction to be inappropriate remedies
congressional authorization to displace state law,'" but rather on the proper authority of the
agency to regulate the area in question. City of New Yor*, 486 U.S. at 64 (quoting Fidelity Fed.
Says. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982)). The Court further noted that
federal regulation should be allowed to preempt state law where it "'represents a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the
statute.... Id. (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). The Court then
cautioned, however, that the regulation will not be held to preempt state law where "'it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned.'" Id.
165. See infra Part III (demonstrating inconsistency between Department's regulation and
state ethics rules). But see Inre Gorence, 810 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D.N.M. 1992) (asserting that
duties of prosecutor do not conflict with ethical duties); United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp.
964, 969 (D.D.C. 1993), appealed No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (giving Attorney General authority to promulgate regulations
governing conduct of Department ofJustice employees).
167. In order for federal regulation to preempt state law, the regulation must be within the
authority granted to the agency putting forth the regulation. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 970
(refusing to interfere with disciplinary proceedings against federal prosecutor "[b ] ecause state
regulation of the federal function is here authorized by Congress" through Appropriation Act).
In light of the Appropriation Act and a House subcommittee hearing regarding state regulation
of DOJ attorneys, there is no evidence of Congress' intent to authorize the new regulation. See
supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
168. See Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12 (establishing
preemption of state ethics rules by proposed regulation).
169. Cf. Sperry v. Florida ex reL Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) (holding that where
Congress has not exceeded scope of authority granted to it, it may preempt state law).
170. See infra Part IH.B.2 (discussing inherent power of federal courts to address discipline
of attorneys who practice before them).
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for a violation of the anti-contact rule.' Without these remedies,
the only option available to federal courts seeking to address ethical
violations is referral to state disciplinary tribunals. Therefore, the
Department's regulation fails the second prong of the preemption
test; the regulation cannot be within the scope of the Department's
congressionally delegated authority because it would interfere with
judicial oversight of federal attorneys, thereby violating the separation
of powers doctrine.
B. Supervisory Power of Federal Courts Over Conduct of Attorneys
The commentary to the final version of the Department of Justice
regulation contains significant discussion of the relationship between
the regulation and the federal courts' ability to enforce ethical
principles utilizing their local rulemaking power or inherent
supervisory powers. 172  In previous commentary, the Department of
Justice took the position that the separation of powers doctrine 173
prevents the federal courts from using either their local rulemaking
power 74 or their inherent supervisory authority75 to discipline
federal prosecutors when they violate DR 7-104 during a federal
investigation or prosecution.7'7 Most of the commentary to the final
regulation adopts the position taken in the earlier commentary. 77
The Department's position, however, is ill-conceived and misinterprets
171. See United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that appropriate
remedy for violation of DR 7-104(A) (1) is disciplinary action); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d
110, 112 (10th Cir.) (concluding that reversal of conviction is not appropriate remedy for
violation of DR 7-104), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
172. Communications with Represented Persons, infraapp., § 77.12 (setting out position that
inconsistent local federal court rules are preempted by Department's regulation). Accord
Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,096 (containing virtually no
discussion ofjustification for Department regulation preempting local court rules and inherent
supervisory authority).
173. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (laying out,
in detail, Founders' concerns underlying separation of powers doctrine); THE FEDERAISr No.
78, at 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1981) ("It equally proves that though
individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts ofjustice, the general liberty
of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary
remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive.").
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988) (authorizing federal courts to adopt local rules necessary
for administration ofjudicial business); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (authorizing district courts to enact
local court rules).
175. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing scope and impact of inherent supervisory authority of
federal courts).
176. See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,980 (laying out
Department's argument that federal case law inconsistent with proposed regulation is not
controlling).
177. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(stating that local district court rules, even those dealing with attorney discipline, may not
displace legislatively authorized national rules of procedure).
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the relationship of the Department's regulations to the federal courts'
local rulemaking power and inherent supervisory authority.
1. Federal courts' local rulemaking power to adopt ethics rules
Congress has granted federal courts the ability to promulgate local
rules to govern the administration of judicial business. 8 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has authorized federal courts to adopt local
court rules that govern matters of detail."7 9 The First Circuit in
United States v. Klubock8 ° recognized a four-part test for determining
whether a district court has the authority to promulgate a particular
local rule."' In order for a local rule to be within the authority of
the district court, the local rule: (1) cannot conflict with an Act of
Congress; (2) cannot conflict with a procedure adopted by the
Supreme Court; (3) cannot violate the Constitution; and (4) must
deal with subject matter that is in the power of the federal court to
govern.1
8 2
In contending that these local court rules should give way to a
regulation by the executive branch, the Department of Justice relies
on two principle arguments. 8 First, the Department argues that
the power of the federal courts to issue, rules is narrowly pre-
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2071. The statute provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to
time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section
2072 of this title.
Id.
179. FED. R CRiM. P. 57. The Rule states:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereofmay from time to time,
after giving appropriate notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules
governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.... In all cases not provided
for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any
manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (providing for rulemaking in same manner as FED. R. CRIM. P. 57).
180. 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
181. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Frazier v. Heebe, 482
U.S. 641, 654 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)).
182. Id.
183. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(summarizing Department of Justice arguments); see also Communications with Represented
Persons, supra note 21, at 39,980-81 (basing arguments on principle that state rules might
interfere with duties of federal officials). The Department ofJustice actually relies primarily on
the fact that the regulation will satisfy the "authorized by law" provision of the model rule.
Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917. Because the
'authorized by law" provision of DR 7-104(A) (1) and MR 4.2 concerns the interpretation of the
anti-contact rule, it will be analyzed later in this Comment. See infra Part III.A This section
focuses on the authority of the Department to supersede the courts' oversight of attorney
professional ethics.
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scribed.'84 In earlier commentary, the Department relied primarily
on Baylson v. Disciplina?y Board' and the dissenting opinion of
Judge Campbell in United States v. Klubock,186 neither of which
support the Department's position. 18 7 Both of these decisions deal
with the conflict between a local district court rule prohibiting
prosecutors from summoning an attorney to testify before a grand
jury about the attorney's client' and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17, which governs the issuance of grand jury subpoe-
nas. 89 The district court in Baylson refused to apply the district
court rule to federal attorneys because the rule created mechanisms
forjudicial review, rules of procedure, and evidentiary standards, all
of which are prohibited by the local rulemaking authority.190 These
mechanisms are not present with judicial enforcement of DR 7-
104(A) (1) when a federal court refers the violation of the anti-contact
rule to the state ethics commission. Furthermore, the opinion in
Klubock recognizes that ethical regulation of attorneys is a proper
subject for the exercise of the court's local rulemaking authority. 9 '
In the commentary to the final regulation, the Department makes a
184. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(asserting that supervisory power of federal courts does not extend to disciplining persons not
before court); see also Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,980
(contending that local rulemaking authority of federal district courts is "narrowly limited").
185. 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. deniAe, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
186. 832 F.2d 649, 658-60 & n.25 (1st Cir.) (Campbell,J., dissenting), affid on reh'gby equally
divided cour 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
187. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,980-81 (reading Baylson
and Klubock as supporting proposition that federal district court rule that seeks to prohibit
otherwise legal conduct of DOJ attorneys in exercise of their out-of-court investigatory duties
would almost certainly exceed local rulemaking authority).
188. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 41, at 359-86 (giving detailed account of scope and
application of subpoena rule to federal prosecutors). In both Baylson and Kiubock, the local
court rule was initially a state ethics provision, but was later adopted by the district court
through its local rulemaking authority. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 104-05 (3d
Cir. 1992) (adopting Rules of Professional Conduct of Pennsylvania Supreme Court), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665-66 (1st Cir. 1987) (accepting
rule requiring priorjudicia approval before grandjury subpoenas may be served on attorneys).
189. See Baylson, 975 F.2d at 108 (noting that "neither Rule 17 nor any other provision in the
federal rules or statutes allows for judicial intervention before a subpoena is served"); Kiubock,
832 F.2d at 665 (stating that Rule 17 allows for nondiscretionary issuance of subpoenas).
190. See Baylson, 975 F.2d at 105 (adopting decision of district court, though on narrower
grounds, that adopted rule is invalid because its adoption as federal law falls outside local
rulemaking authority of federal district courts); see also Almond v. United States Court, 852 F.
Supp. 78, 87 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that attorney subpoena rule is unauthorized exercise of
court's rulemaking authority because, although it "undoubtedly implicates 'latent' ethical
concerns .... it requires the creation of... a novel form of grand jury procedure").
191. Kiubock, 832 F.2d at 667 (recognizing that courts have inherent and statutory authority
to control ethical matters in their forum); see also Klubock, 832 F.2d at 654-55 ("The ethical
relationships between courts, attorneys and their clients, although obviously of interest to
Congress and the Supreme Court, have been left traditionally to the primary regulation of the
courts before whom those problems arise. The regulation by district courts of the ethical
conduct of those who practice before it can hardly be called 'a fundamental change.'").
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very compelling argument,' 9' contending that a "local rule inconsis-
tent with a regulation lawfully issued under statutory authority is, as
a matter of law, inconsistent with the underlying statute, and must
yield to Congress's paramount authority as delegated to the depart-
ment or agency issuing the regulation."'9 3
While this proposition is -indisputably correct,194 the operative
language is "a regulation lawfully issued."'95 The regulation at issue
here is outside the scope of the Department's rulemaking power. It
conflicts with both Congress' intent to delegate the licensing of
federal attorneys to the States' 96 and the federal courts' inherent
authority to supervise the attorneys who practice before them.' 97
The local court rules, which adopt state or ABA ethics provisions, do
not conflict with the congressional statute delegating authority to the
Department of Justice because no authority to exempt federal
prosecutors from state ethics provisions has been delegated to the
Department.
The Department also argues that the separation of powers doctrine
requires that where an executive and judicial rule conflict, thejudicial
rule must give way. 98 The Department of Justice cannot fashion a
constitutional principle by simply declaring it to be true, and the sole
case cited by the Department for this proposition simply does not
support that contention.199 Furthermore, as noted below, a more
192. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(relying on underlying principle that DOJ's legislative authority supersedes courts' local
rulemaking authority).
193. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917.
194. See supra note 178 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2071, which clearly states that local rules may
not be inconsistent with Act of Congress). Where Congress authorizes the Department ofJustice
to promulgate regulations, federal courts cannot promulgate local rules that conflict withJustice
regulations without infringing on Congress' ability to delegate regulationmaking authority to its
agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988).
195. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(emphasis added).
196. See supra Part 11A (setting forth position that Congress did not intend to delegate to
Department ofJustice power to promulgate regulations concerning attorney ethics).
197. See infra Part HI.B.2.
198. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,980-81.
199. See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,981 (citing
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924)). Michaelson dealt with the inherent
supervisory powers of the federal courts, not their rulemaking authority. See Michaelson, 266 U.S.
at 65-66 (dismissing petitioner's argument that statute interfered with courts' inherent contempt
power, because "the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many
times decided and may be regarded as settled law"). The statute at issue in Michaelson created
a procedure for dealing with criminal contempt. See id. at 64. The Supreme Court upheld the
statute on the ground that the statute merely governed the procedure for conducting criminal
contempt and not the power of the court to use contempt to punish. Id. at 65-66. The Court
held that the statute "does not interfere with the power to deal summarily with contcmpts
committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice, and is in express terms carefully limited to the cases of contempt specifically defined."
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accurate application of the separation of powers doctrine would
sustain the courts' supervisory authority over the Department's
conflicting regulation.
20 0
2. Inherent supervisory power offederal courts to regulate conduct of
attorneys
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have clearly laid out
the inherent power of the federal courts to control the attorneys
before them.20  That supervisory power originates from the interests
federal courts have in assuring that trials are conducted in a fair
manner202 and "ensuring that justice is done."20 3  In United States
v. Hastings,2 4 the Supreme Court set out the three situations in
which a court may exercise its inherent supervisory authority: (1) "to
implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights"; (2) to
preserve judicial integrity by assuring that the jury is allowed to
consider only the evidence properly before it; and (3) to deter further
illegal conduct.2 5
The Department ofJustice claims that the courts' inherent power
to supervise the attorneys who come before them is narrowly
prescribed.2 6  The Department's position finds support in the
Supreme Court's observation that federal courts do not have a
"'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which they
Id. at 66.
200. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (positing that Department's regulation
infringes on court's inherent supervisory authority over conduct of attorneywho practices before
court thereby violating separation of powers doctrine).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992) ("The court's supervisory
power... may be used as a means of establishing standards of prosecutorial conduct before the
courts themselves."); United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1983) (listing three
purposes for which supervisory powers may be exercised), discussed infra text accompanying note
205; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (holding that supervision of criminal
justice is not limited to determination of constitutional or statutory violations of prosecutorial
misconduct); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939) (holding that judges must
have discretion to control administration of justice before federal courts); United States v.
Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The Court of Appeals also has power to fashion
remedies directly against an attorney persistently engaging in improper courtroom conduct."),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982). In United States v. Lopez, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the three
interests set out in Hastings, United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993), and
explicitly noted that the supervisory powers have been upheld as a means of policing prosecu-
torial misconduct. Id.
202. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1463 ("Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that
criminal trials are conducted within the ethical, standards of the profession and that legal
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.").
203. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991).
204. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
205. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505.
206. Communications with Represented Persons, supranote 21, at 39,981 (arguing that local
rulemaking authority is limited to prescribing local practices as to "matters of detail").
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d[o] not approve."" 7 The "chancellor's foot veto" condemned by
the Supreme Court, however, is the unprincipled use of supervisory
power. The Supreme Court in United States v. Russell.. noted that
"[t]he execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is
confided primarily to the Executive Branch of the Government,
subject to applicable constitutional and statutory limitations and to
judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limitations."2" The Court
has also noted, however, that "[ t] he uniform first step for admission
to any federal court is admission to a state court. The federal court
is entitled to rely on the attorney's knowledge of the state code of
professional conduct applicable in that state court."210  The
adoption of state ethics rules by local federal courts is simply a way for
the federal court to ensure that the congressional limitations, which
require that all Department of Justice attorneys are licensed by the
bar of at least one State, are met.
Similarly, in United States v. Simpson21 the Ninth Circuit con-
demned the use of supervisory power as courts "mak[ing] up the rules
as they go, imposing limits on the executive according to whim or
will."212 Unprincipled enforcement of the will of the judiciary upon
unapproving law enforcement personnel is not, however, a danger
when the court merely has adopted, by local rule, a clear ethical
principle supported by substantial case law.2" 3
The Department asserts that "[t]he regulation ... accords
substantial and appropriate deference to the court's supervisory
authority over the parties and proceedings before it."214 While the
Department is correct that the regulation affords courts significant
oversight,215 the oversight authorized by the regulation is insufficient
207. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
208. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
209. Russe!/ 411 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).
210. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985).
211. 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1991).
212. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).
213. See In re Investigation of FMC Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (S.D. W. Va. 1977). In
FMC, the court observed:
In exercising its supervisory power, the canons enjoy great weight in the court's
assessment of whether appropriate standards are being observed by lawyers in the
course of their practice within thejurisdiction of the court. The canons are themselves
the product of experience gained over the decades, even the centuries, and are
designed to establish and assure standards of simple fairness and moral and ethical
responsibility on the part of counsel in furtherance of the ends ofjustice.
Id.
214. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917.
215. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(allowing no substantive communication to occur without consent of counsel unless: court finds
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, communication is made pursuant to court-approved
discovery procedures; or communication concerns criminal or civil offense different from
886
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for two reasons. First, the regulation only authorizes courts to police
constitutional violations of the parties' Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights." 6 Rules of professional ethics, however, extend protections
and limitations that are broader than the constitutional limits.
17
The second reason that the regulation provides insufficient
oversight by federal courts is that it authorizes a federal court to
punish attorney misconduct only when the prosecutor comes into
federal court." The Supreme Court's recent opinion in United
States v. Williams"9 would, at first glance, appear to support the
Department's position on separation of powers, i.e., that courts
cannot sanction attorney conduct that occurs outside of the court
process. That case dealt with the scope of the lower courts' inherent
supervisory authority in grand jury proceedings.220  The opinion
limited the ability of the lower court to dismiss an indictment because
a prosecutor failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.2 1  In reaching that conclusion, the Court made broad state-
ments about the limited authority of the courts to punish prosecutors
for conduct that does not occur before the court.222 A closer
reading of Williams, however, indicates that the opinion does not
foreclose enforcement of the anti-contact rule by federal courts.
The holding in Williams differs from the current situation in two
important ways. First, the Court placed significant emphasis on the
independence of the grand jury from both the court and the
prosecutor.223 Enforcement of ethics rules, on the other hand, has
always been an important function of the courts. As one court has
recognized, the ethics violations do not need to occur in the presence
offense before court).
216. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(observing that "this regulation does not... disturb the authority of federal courts to fashion
appropriate remedies when ex parte contact violates the Constitution") (emphasis added).
217. See infra note 338 (citing several cases holding that anti-contact rule extends beyond
constitutional protections).
218. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,917
(recognizing that regulation governs attorney's conduct when he is "not before the court").
219. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
220. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992) (acknowledging that grand jury
functions independently ofjudicial branch).
221. Id. at 1741-42.
222. Id. (recognizing that grand jury is separate institution and, as general matter, courts
have no "supervisory" judicial authority over it).
223. Id. at 1742-46 ("The grand jury's functional independence from the judicial branch is
evident both in the scope of its power to investigate criminal wrongdoing, and in the manner
in which that power is exercised."); see also Almond v. United States Court, 852 F. Supp. 78, 85
(D.N.H. 1994) (noting that Williams prohibited judicial oversight from interfering with
independence of grand jury system).
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of the court in order for the court to enforce the ethical princi-
ples.2 24
The second important distinction between the holding in Williams
and enforcement of DR 7-104 is that in Williams there was no explicit
rule requiring prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury.2s It is this unbridled discretion of the district court to
exercise a "chancellor's foot veto" over prosecutorial conduct that the
Court in Williams condemned.2 6  The anti-contact rule provides a
longstanding ethical principle by which federal prosecutors can guide
themselves without fear of discipline from the federal court. It does
not provide the danger of an unwritten rule that the federal court can
impose on federal law enforcement officials by will or whim.
Furthermore, the separation of powers argument actually cuts
against the Department of Justice.27  By promulgating a rule of
ethics, the Department ofJustice actually usurps the supervisory power
of the judiciary to control the actions of court officers.228 Several
courts have also noted that it remains within their inherent superviso-
ry powers to refer violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
to the appropriate state ethics commission for investigation and
potential sanction. 2 Because the Department of Justice may not
strip a co-equal branch of government of its inherent and inseparable
power by simple regulation,230 it must either abide by the current
224. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir.) (citing numerous cases for
proposition that "the competence of the district courts to make local rules regarding the
admission of attorneys to their respective bars, and the control of their conduct thereafter,
cannot at this late date be seriously questioned"), affd on reh'g by equally divided cour, 832 F.2d
664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
225. See Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 174142 n.6 (listing standards of behavior for prosecutors as
set forth in United States Code).
226. Id. at 1741.
227. See ABA Report No. 301, supra note 67, at 3 (asserting that DOJ's position on MR 4.2
is "unilateral assumption of authority to render self-interested interpretations of ethical
standards").
228. See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1983) (holding that "'guided by
considerations ofjustice,' and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within
limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress"
(quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943))); see also ABA Report No. 301,
supra note 67, at 7 (establishing ABA's position that Thornburgh Memorandum usurps judicial
authority, violating separation of powers).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (averring that
referring federal officials to state bar for disciplinary proceedings is adequate action to discipline
and punish government attorneys who attempt to circumvent "standards of their profession");
United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 668 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that appropriate remedy for
violation of DR 7-104(A) (1) is disciplinary action); Kiubock, 832 F.2d at 665 (upholding power
of state disciplinary board to address ethics violation by federal officer).
230. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (holding that contempt power
of federaljudiciary is central to its authority); ABA Report No. 301, supra note 67, at 7 (asserting
that "no federal regulation should be allowed to usurp this traditional and fundamental role of
the judiciary" to issue rules of court (citing Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634
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version of the anti-contact rule or make efforts to change the rule in
those jurisdictions in which it is unsatisfied with the interpretation of
the rule.231
III. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-CONTACT RULE IN ITS
APPLICATION TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
The regulation promulgated by the Department ofJustice regarding
communications with persons represented by counsel is not a proper
exercise of the Department's rulemaking authority.22 Unresolved
issues, however, still remain concerning the application of DR 7-
104(A) (1) to federal prosecutors. Specifically, there are seven issues
that remain the subject of debate and concern among federal
prosecutors and the courts regarding the interpretation of the anti-
contact rule:233  (1) are prosecutors "authorized by law" to contact
represented persons without the consent of counsel by virtue of their
duty to investigate and enforce the law; (2) is an indictment or other
formal proceeding necessary for a person to become a "party" to the
criminal process; (3) if unindicted crimes are subject to the anti-
contact rule, when has a party retained counsel in the "matter"; (4)
does the rule prohibit covert communications with represented
persons; (5) if covert communications are prohibited by the rule, to
what extent are prosecutors responsible for the actions of investigators
and informers; (6) may a prosecutor have overt contact with a
represented person if that person initiates the contact; and (7)
assuming DR 7-104(A) (1) is applicable against federal prosecutors,
what is the appropriate remedy for a violation?
A. Scope of "Authorized by Law" Provision of Anti-Contact Rule
A primary argument used by the Department ofJustice to justify its
F.2d 408 (1980), afd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983))).
231. See ABA Report No. 301, supra note 67, at 9 (arguing that if it is necessary to get
exemptions for federal attorneys DOJ must do so through individual jurisdictions); Taylor, supra
note 125, at 17 (criticizing Department's policy on anti-contact rule for seeking exemption for
federal lawyers to state ethics rules, and recommending several changes that Department could
seek in state rules).
232. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (limiting power of head of Executive department to writing
regulations to govern his or her department, its employees, and its business). The Attorney
General is authorized by Congress to create rules governing "the conduct of its employees." Id.
This regulatory power does not extend to a right to infringe on courts' inherent power to
control the conduct of attorneys before them, because this power is "inseparable." Michaelsn,
266 U.S. at 66; see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985) ("Federal Courts admit and
suspend attorneys as an exercise of their inherent power, the standards imposed are a matter
of federal law.").
233. See Green, supra note 13, at 289 (listing questions presented by application of DR 7-
,104(A) (1) to federal law enforcement officials).
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regulation"S4 is that the ABA version of the anti-contact rule (and
equivalent versions adopted in most states),235 as well as the ethics
provisions of most local federal rules,"5 contain a provision allowing
contact without the knowledge or consent of the attorney when the
opposing counsel is "authorized by law" to contact the party direct-
ly.237 Prior to the formal promulgation of the regulations, the
Department relied on its statutory authority to orchestrate criminal
investigations,s collect evidence,239 and prosecute crime 240 as
justifications for contacting represented persons in violation of DR 7-
104.241 Most courts, with one notable exception, have rejected this
234. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12; see also United States v.
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993) (reiterating Department's position that DOJ attorneys
fall within "authorized by law" exception to California ethics rule); United States v. Hammad,
858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (acknowledging argument by Government that federal
prosecutors are authorized by law to contact represented parties during criminal investigation),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 486 (D.N.M. 1992) (setting forth
Department's argument that it is vested with authority to interpret when and how code of ethics
applies to Assistant U.S. Attorneys); Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111,
at 10,102 (detailing circumstances in which federal official may contact represented individual);
Richard Thornburgh, Ethics and theAttorney Generak TheAttorney General Responds, 74JUDICATURE
290, 291 (1991) (responding to criticism that Thornburgh Memorandum relies heavily on
Supremacy Clause); Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 492 (establishing position that
general statutory authority to investigate and prosecute crime authorizes federal prosecutors to
contact represented parties).
235. See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,096 ("Virtually all
the states have adopted some version of DR 7-104 or Model Rule 4.2 that includes an
'authorized by law' exception."). But see FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-4.2
(1992) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer."). The Florida Supreme Court
explicitly did not adopt the "authorized by law" provision in its ethics code. Id. The Florida
State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics has also issued an opinion rejecting the
Thornburgh Memorandum's position that the anti-contact rule should not apply to federal
prosecutors. See Florida State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-4 (July 15,
1990), available inWestlaw, 1990 WL 446959, at *1 (stating that"Florida Rule 4-4.2 (communica-
tions with person represented by counsel) contains no exception for activities of U.S.
Department of Justice attorneys").
236. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1991) (detailing local federal
district court rules' adoption of attorney-disciplinary measures).
237. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuar Rule 4.2 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY DR 7-104(A) (1) (1980).
238. 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing Attorney General to appoint
officials to conduct criminal investigations).
239. Id.
240. 28 U.S.C. §§ 515(a), 533, 547.
241. See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 493 (asserting that "authorized by law"
provision of ethical rule is basis for exemption of federal prosecutors engaged in authorized law
enforcement activity from ethical rule); see also United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th
Cir. 1993) (rejecting Department's reliance on "authorized by law" provision); hn re Doe, 801 F.
Supp. 478, 487 (D.N.M. 1992) (refusing to accept Department's argument that "authorized by
law" provision of ethical rule made contact with defendant permissible); Brief for Appellant,
supra note 103, at 4 n.2 (noting that issue before court on appeal is not validity of DOJ
regulation "because it did not govern the conduct at issue" in this appeal); Thornburgh, supra
note 234, at 336 (rebutting claim that Supremacy Clause is main justification for Thornburgh
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argument.24 2
The exception was the Second Circuit in United States v.
Hammad,243 which found that the general enabling statutes did give
prosecutors the authority to conduct or supervise legitimate investiga-
tive actions that resulted in the communication with represented
persons in the absence of their counsel.2"" But the court was also
careful to note "that in some instances a government prosecutor may
overstep the already broad powers of his office, and in so doing,
violate the ethical precepts of DR 7-104(A) (1)."24 The court left
the determination of when a prosecutor overstepped his authority for
a "case-by-case adjudication."M This case-by-case adjudication
suggested by the Hammad court, however, is an unacceptable method
of determining the limits on a prosecutor's ability to contact
represented individuals. Case-by-case adjudication gives courts what
the Supreme Court has condemned as a "'chancellor's foot' veto over
law enforcement practices of which it did not approve."247
Now that the regulation has been adopted by the Department of
Justice, the "authorized by law" argument has become more compel-
ling.248 However, the authority of the Department to override the
supervisory power of the federal courts and preempt state law, where
Congress has explicitly required that all Department of Justice
attorneys be licensed by one of the States or the District of Columbia
is simply nonexistent.2' The Department's attempt to alter the
near unanimous opinion of federal courts that DR 7-104 applies to
federal prosecutors is bound to meet with resistance in the courts.250
Memorandum and asserting that "authorized by law" provision of ethical rule supports
Department's position).
242. See, e.g., Lope; 4 F.3d at 1461 (citing commentary to California anti-contact rule that
requires "express statutory schemes" for exemption from ethics rule); Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 486-87
(relying on Lopez analysis to reject Department's argument).
243. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
244. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (reasoning that where
prosecutor is conducting proper law enforcement activity, including authorizing undercover
investigations, prosecutor is acting within his statutory authority, and therefore his conduct is
"authorized by law"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
245. Id. at 839-40.
246. Id. at 840.
247. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (limiting federal court's power to
prevent law enforcement techniques through entrapment).
248. See United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting earlier
"authorized by law" argument based on Thornburgh Memorandum because Memorandum "was
neither promulgated pursuant to notice and comment rule-making nor published in the Federal
Register"), appealed, No. 93-5233 (D.C. Cir. argued Dec. 8, 1994).
249. See supra Part II (discussing weaknesses in DOJ's supremacy clause and separation of
powers arguments).
250. Cf. Norton, supra note 39, at 207 (noting that ABA House of Delegates voted
overwhelmingly to condemn Thornburgh Memorandum). Norton's article clearly lays out the
dangers of the Department ofJustice's position regarding the application of ethics rules to all
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B. Application of Anti-Contact Rule to Preindictment Communications
The regulation put forth by the Department of Justice rejects a
blanket prohibition against communications with represented persons
prior to the attachment of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel. 251  The regulations permit most noncustodial, investigatory
communications with a represented person before the attachment of
the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel.252 This policy
government attorneys as well as state law enforcement officials. Id. at 206-07. Norton observes
that if the Department is successful with this attempt to exempt law enforcement officials, the
logic carries over to all ethics rules and to all attorneys working in all executive and legislative
agencies in the federal government. Id. at 207. In fact, the Department essentially already takes
the position that it has the power to exempt its attorneys from.all ethics rules: "[Elven though
the Department has the authority to exempt its attorneys from the reach of [MR 4.2 and DR 7-
104(A)(1)], the Department has decided not to implement a wholesale exemption."
Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,911 (emphasis
added). There is nothing in the Department's reasoning that indicates its power to create a
"wholesale exemption" from other ethics rules is more restricted. SeeTaylor, supra note 125, at
17,30 (questioning how Department's reasoning limits it to seeking exemption from anti-contact
rule). Moreover, state prosecutors are beginning to pursue in state courts a separation of
powers argument similar to that asserted by the Department ofJustice. Norton, supra note 39,
at 207 (citing Triple A Machine Shop Inc. v. State, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1989); In re Criminal
Investigation No. 13, 573 A.2d 51 (Md. App. 1990)).
On August 6, 1994, when the Department presented its new regulation to the ABA, ABA
President R. William Ide, III, characterized the Department's regulation as "misguided." Ballard,
supra note 39, at 7. He criticized the Department's efforts, observing that "[t]his approach
would substitute the Attorney General's regulation of lawyers for the control and supervision
that has historically been the province of the state and federal judiciary." Id.
Finally, it is significant to observe that the regulation has critics in the highest levels of the
judiciary. The Conference of State Supreme Court Chief Justices attacked the regulation,
'arguing that the Department lacks authority to preempt state ethics rules or to supersede local
federal district court rules." Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra
note 2, at 39,913. This august group also asserted "that it is the exclusive province of the state
supreme courts to construe state disciplinary rules and to determine whether this regulation falls
within the 'authorized by law' exception to these rules." Id. at 39,916 (emphasis added); see also
Maria B. Rubin, The Thornburgh Memo, Now the Reno Rule: A Case of Ethics, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 23,
1994, at 1, 4 (noting that "the Conference of ChiefJudges (of state courts) 'urged its members
to enforce the no-contact rule with regard to "all members of the bar" as the Justice
Department's assertion of power violates "principles of federalism" and is 'without appropriate
authority.'" (quoting Daniel Weis, ClintonAdministration Embraces Thornburgh Memo, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
8, 1994, at 1)).
251. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.7; see also Communications
with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,922-23 (stating that individuals who
are neither arrestees nor defendants may be communicated with, directly or indirectly, by
government attorneys, but recognizing that overt communications raise different considerations
than covert ones and should be circumspect).
252. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.7; see also Communications
with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,922-23 (discussing in commentary
need for preindictment noncustodial communications). But see Communications with
Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.8 to .9 (limiting both communications with represented
person concerning plea negotiations and interference with attorney-client relationships);
Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,097 (proposing changes to
U.S. ArroRNays' MANUAL § 9-13.231, which limits overt communications with represented
persons).
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accurately reflects the position of a majority of the case law and
supporting authority.253 There are, however, notable exceptions.
The Second Circuit in United States v. Hammad flatly refused to limit
the application of DR 7-104 to the point after the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attached. 4
In Hammad, the court upheld a lower court finding that the AUSA
had violated DR 7-104(A) (1)," but refused to suppress acquired
evidence because of the previously unsettled nature of the law.256
The court refused to link the application of DR 7-104 to the attach-
ment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because of the
distinct, albeit related, goals that each protection is intended to
afford. 7 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the indictment
process is under the control of the prosecutor and could be manipu-
lated to gather information that could not be obtained after the
attachment of the right to counsel. 8  In order "to avoid
handcuffing law enforcement officers in their efforts to develop
evidence,"" through, for example, directing undercover investiga-
tions prior to indictment, the court held that the use of legitimate law
253. See, e.g., United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that anti-contact
rule does not apply in preindictment situations); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731,739 (10th
Cir.) (rejecting defendant's suggestion that Tenth Circuit adopt Hammads application of anti-
contact rule to preindictment phase of investigation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United
States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.) (rejecting application of DR 7-104(A) (1) to
undercover operations), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d
941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that noncustodial, preindictment communication through
informant did not violate "current ethical standards demanded of the legal profession"), cert.
denied; 415 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 421 (D. Md. 1994)
(rejecting application of anti-contact rule in preindictment, noncustodial setting and citing
circuits that support this proposition); United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1436
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing numerous cases for proposition that "[e]ach federal circuit addressing
this issue has indicated that DR 7-104(A) (1) would not apply in the investigatory phase of a
criminal case"); Cramton & Udell, supra note 41, at 338 (concluding that goals of DR 7-
104(A) (1) in protecting attorney-client relationship are not advanced by application of anti-
contact rule to covert, preindictment investigations); Green, supra note 13, at 293-97
(determining that application of DR 7-104 in investigatory phase is "prosecutor's nightmare
come true").
254. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990); see supra note 46 and accompanying text (laying out facts of Hammad).
255. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840 (finding that informant acted as prosecutor's alter ego in
violation of anti-contact rule).
256. Id. at 840-42 (following rationale used to suppress evidence in case of constitutional
violation where anything short of exclusion would be ineffective in reaching rule's goals).
257. Id. at 839 (stating that Constitution establishes minimum level of protection required
to satisfy defendant's rights, while Model Code of Professional Responsibility "encompasses the
attorney's duty to 'maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct'" (citing MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILrrY pmbl. (1981))).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 838.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:855
enforcement techniques is "authorized by law."2" But the court
found that the Government's use of the sham subpoena was not a
legitimate law enforcement tactic and, therefore, the AUSA had
violated the anti-contact rule.2 61
The second notable case is United States v. JaMiL262 Although this
case was reversed on appeal263 on the issue of "alter egos,"211 the
case is important because it provides one of the first exhaustive
analyses of the application of DR 7-104(A) (1) to federal prosecutors.
The opinion concludes that the anti-contact rule applies to
preindictment, covert communications with represented persons.265
The facts of the case provide insight into the difficulties of limiting
the applicability of DR 7-104(A) (1) to postindictment situations.
Jamil was the target of a grand jury investigation in which indict-
ments were imminent.266 The defense counsel and the AUSA had
several meetings to discuss the probable prosecution of Jamil.267
The defendant's counsel instructed customs agents working on the
case not to talk with Jamil without their consent.21 The agents,
counter to these instructions, found a willing informer who agreed to
wear a wire and record his conversations with the suspect.26 9 The
informer captured a conversation with the suspect and his counsel on
tape.27' Although the AUSA did not know of the actions of the
agents beforehand, he was later eager to use the recordings in the
prosecution ofJamil. 7'
The district court found that the attempted use of this information
was a violation of DR 7-104(A) (1).27' The court rendered an
insightful analysis into the goals and application of DR 7-104(A) (1),
rejecting the argument that the language of the ethics rule, which
mentions a "represented party," provides a significant distinction
between the pre- and postindictment applicability of the anti-contact
260. Id. at 839; see supra Part I.A (discussing "authorized by law" provision of DR 7-
104(A) (1)).
261. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840.
262. 546 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
263. United States v.Jamil, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
264. See infra Part II.C (discussing use of agents or other alter egos by attorney to
communicate with represented person).
265. United States v.Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on otlergrounds, 707
F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
266. See id. at 649.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 649-50.
270. See id. at 650.
271. See id. at 651.
272. Id. at 655 ("An ethical violation [of DR 7-104(A) (1)] would occur at the moment the
evidence is introduced .... ").
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rule.27" The court reasoned that such a distinction would be too
formalistic. 274 The fact that a person was subject to an investigation,
was aware of it, and retained counsel for that purpose was sufficient
for DR 7-104 to apply.2' The court reasoned that ruling that DR
7-104(A) (1) attached only when formal criminal proceedings had
commenced "is not in harmony with the spirit" of the Code of
Professional Conduct.7 6 The object of the anti-contact rule, the
court reasoned, is to "protect a client from squandering a possible
claim or defense and to insure against disclosure of privileged
information."277 These dangers exist as much prior to an indict-
ment as after.278
Although a majority of courts reject application of DR 7-104(A) (1)
to the preindictment setting, Hammad and Jamil represent clear
instances in which a limitation on the application of the rule to after
the commencement of formal proceedings would seriously undermine
the goals of DR 7-104. It is possible, however, to reconcile the goals
of DR 7-104(A) (1) with the need for prosecutors to conduct thorough
273. Id. at 653.
274. Id.; cf In reSimels, No. M2-238 (LIS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17454, at "4-11 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 10, 1993) (applying DR 7-104(A) (1) to attorney who interviewed witness connected to
proceedings, but not formally charged). The court in Simels rejected a narrow reading of
"party," reasoning that a strict interpretation of the term would raise form over substance. Id.
at *6. The court reasoned that where a person's interests were so intertwined with the pending
litigation, although not a formal party to the proceedings, that person must be considered a
party to the matter. Id. at *5; see also HAzARD & HODES, supra note 109, § 4.2:110, at 744.1 n.2
(noting requiring formal charges to fall within definition of "party" under MR 4.2 would be too
technical and narrow view of Rule).
275. Jami4 546 F. Supp. at 653-54 (drawing analogy to situation where target of investigation
is advised to seek advice of counsel when his testimony is sought by grand jury).
276. Id. at 654.
277. Id.
278. See id. ("[Tihe most critical phase is often before indictment; it is then that the skilled
attorney uses persuasion and negotiation to forestall or shape the potential prosecution."); see
also Martin S. Murphy, The "No-Contact"Rule and the Sixth Amendment: A Dilemma for the Ethical
Prosecutor, 38 BOSTON B.J. 8 (1994).
Although Murphy concludes that DR 7-104(A) (1) should not be applied to prosecutors before
indictment, he makes strong arguments in favor of its pretrial application:
[C]onstitutional protections protect citizens only after criminal proceedings begin or
police interrogate a suspect in custody. By then, it is often too late. In many cases,
statements made by suspects before formal proceedings began to provide the most
powerful evidence for the prosecution at trial, and even the best courtroom lawyering
by defense counsel cannot undo the damage that a client has caused by speaking to
investigators. The issue cuts across the entire criminal process: individual defendants
charged with even minor offenses often find that their words, spoken without benefit
of counsel, come back to haunt them, and Fortune 500 corporations being investigated
for fraud against the government, their customers, or violations of environmental laws
are not immune from the unpleasant discovery that statements made by their own
employees to criminal investigators in the early stages of a governmental inquiry
effectively require the company to work out a plea with the government rather than
fight the charges brought against it.
Id. at 8.
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investigations.279 The prosecutor should remain free to use under-
cover investigative tactics to elicit information from the suspect so
long as the suspect is unaware he is under investigation and has not
retained counsel to represent him in the investigation.8 0 Once the
suspect is aware that he is the target of a federal investigation and
retains counsel to represent him in the matter, the federal attorney
should not direct further contact with the person.28'
C. Use of Alter Egos
The anti-contact rule also prohibits an attorney from circumventing
the restrictions imposed by the rule by simply communicating with a
represented person through an agent.2 2 Such agents are common-
279. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, §§ 11.6.1 to .2 (discussing goals of anti-contact rule).
Wolfram notes that one goal of the anti-contact rule is to prevent the harm that would occur
if "lawyers were free to exploit the presumedly vulnerable position of a represented but
unadvised party." Id. § 11.6.3.
280. This approach comports with the ethics rule. Contact with a represented person is only
forbidden when a person is represented in the subject matterof the communications. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 4.2 (stating that "a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer" (emphasis added)); MODEL CODE OFPROFESsiONALREPONSIBLlYDR7-104(A) (1) ("[A]
lawyer shall not [c]ommunicate ... on the subjec of a representation with a party he knows to
be represented by a lawyer in that matter...." (emphasis added)). When a person is unaware
of the pending investigation, he cannot be represented in the matter of the criminal
investigation. SeeFlorida State Bar Ass'n Op. No. 90-4 (July 15, 1990), available inWestlaw, 1990
WL 446959, at *2 (noting that in case of undercover investigation it is unlikely that suspect will
realize he is under investigation so will not have retained counsel "in the matter").
281. See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,098 (proposing
changes to U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-13.231 to .241 that would limit overt communications
with represented targets).
Respect for the decision of a person who has chosen to entrust his representation to a trained
attorney lies at the very core of the anti-contact rule. Green, supra note 13, at 285 n.7.
Although the U.S. Attornys'Manual restricts overt communications with represented persons and
targets of investigations, the Department should not be allowed to surreptitiously circumvent a
person's decision to channel communications through an attorney. Id. ("In most cases, a party
retains a lawyer precisely because he considers himself incapable of handling his legal problems
alone. When a party is called on to deal with opposing counsel directly, rather than through
his own lawyer, he may effectively be denied the assistance of counsel."). No one would contend
that a private civil attorney could use undercover investigators to ferret out information for his
client from an opposing litigant. Attorneys for the federal government should be held to no
lesser standard. See State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Kan. 1982) ("The prosecutor is a
lawyer first; a law enforcement officer second. The provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are as applicable to him as they are to all lawyers.").
282. SeeDR7-104(A) (1) (prohibiting attorney from "communicat[ing] orcaus[ing] another
to communicate" with represented person). MR 4.2 does not contain the language "cause
another to communicate" but the Model Code Comparison indicates that the Model Rule "is
substantially identical to DR 7-104(A) (1)." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2
(Model Code Comparison) (1992). The provision "cause another to communicate" has been
moved to MR 8.4(a), which reads: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another...." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC" Rule 8.4 (1982).
The Philadelphia Bar Association issued an opinion in 1990 that describes the limitation on
the use of private investigators by attorneys in civil litigation. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional
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ly referred to as alter egos of the attorney if the attorney directs their
conduct.2 83  The Department of Justice, on the other hand, main-
tains that only limited restrictions should apply to the use of
undercover agents when the prosecutor in charge of the case knows
that the suspect has retained counsel for the purpose of the investiga-
tion.284  Hammad and Jamil both involve the troublesome use of
"alter egos" to communicate with a person represented by counsel in
the preindictment, noncustodial stages of criminal investigation.285
In Hammad, the prosecutor specifically secured the sham subpoena,
was in regular contact with the informer, and directed the operation
while the informer acted merely as an arm of the prosecutorial
power.28 Those courts following Hammad have held that a prereq-
uisite to finding a violation of DR 7-104(A) (1) is a determination that
the nonattorney law enforcement officials who communicated with
the represented suspect were acting as alter egos of the prosecu-
tor.
287
In Jami4 on the other hand, the prosecutor had no knowledge of
Guidance Comm., Op. No. 90-21 (Dec. 1990). The hypothetical posed to the Committee stated
that the plaintiff claimed her injuries prevented her from continuing to earn income through
the selling of a product, such as tupperware, through demonstrations. The attorney wanted to
know if he violated MR 4.2 by authorizing his private investigator to stage a demonstration and
film the plaintiff. He would also film the plaintiff delivering the goods to purchasers. The
Committee emphatically stated that this action would not only violate MR 4.2 but also 8.4(a).
The Committee stated: "Your proposed action is not simply one-sided surveillance of the
plaintiff, but rather active direct communication and interaction with the plaintiff, in order to
prejudice her cause of action." Id.
Except for the fact that this hypothetical was posed in the civil setting, it does not differ
significantly from the conduct that the Department's regulation exempts from the scope of the
anti-contact rule.
283. E.g., United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 1983).
284. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.7 to .9 (prohibiting
communications with represented person that relate to plea negotiations or interfere with
attorney-client relationships). In former versions of the regulation, the Department of Justice
recognized no specific limitations on covert contact with represented persons prior to
indictment See Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,992-93 (limiting
contact with represented persons only after attachment of Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
285. See Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 701 (noting that most courts consider custodial
questioning by police officers to be prohibited by rule because officers are considered agents
of prosecutor and dangers of deceit are just as great as if prosecutor spoke with suspect directly).
286. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that
Hammad required threshold finding that agents were acting as alter egos of prosecutor); United
.States v. Gray, 825 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D. Vt. 1993) (holding agents were not acting as alter ego of
prosecutor because attorney did not control their actions, and therefore application of DR 7-
104(A) (1) was inappropriate); United States v. Harloff, 807 F. Supp. 270, 276-77 (W.D.N.Y.
1992) (finding prosecutor did not direct informant to deceive suspect); see also United States v.
Thompson, 35 F.3d 100, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusing to accept defendant's argument that
anti-contact rule as applied in Hammad to noncustodial, preindictment stage should be extended
to nonattorney law enforcement officers acting without any connection to prosecutor).
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the actions of the customs agents.2" The district court in Jamil held
that the prosecutor did not violate the ethics rule because the law
enforcement agents contacted a represented person without the
knowledge or consent of the prosecutor.289  Notwithstanding this,
the district court went on to hold that the prosecutor became an
accomplice to the agents actions when he attempted to benefit from
the fruits of their conduct by using the information at trial, and at
that point the ethical violation was committed." ° In Jami however,
the Second Circuit rejected this broad definition of alter ego in terms
of the anti-contact rule. 1 The Second Circuit reasoned that such
a broad application of the anti-contact rule would unduly hamper
legitimate investigative techniques.
292
The district court inJamil recognized at least two interests protected
by the ethical rule that may be in jeopardy if undercover contact is
allowed with represented persons. 3 Concerns that lie at the core
of the ethical rule, however, may not be implicated when a
nonattorney communicates with a represented person.294  For
instance, the artful negotiation and skillful persuasion of a trained
attorney are not present when an "alter ego" is used in the contact
with the represented party.295 On the other hand, where the
attorney directs the actions of his agents, the attorney may manipulate
an uncounseled client to the same extent as if the attorney had
288. United States v.Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), reu'd, 707 F.2d 638 (2d
Cir. 1983).
289. Id. at 655.
290. Id. But see Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 697-98 (noting that in civil context, most courts
do not prohibit lawyers from using fruits of communications between client and opposing party
or between agents hired by client and opposing party so long as agents do not act as surrogate
for client's lawyer).
291. Jamil 707 F.2d at 646 (holding that no violation of ethics rules occurred when
prosecutor introduced tape into evidence, because tape was lawfully made as part of
preindictment investigation and attorney had nothing to do with its creation).
292. Id.
293. Jami, 546 F. Supp. at 654 (noting that uncounseled client may squander valid defense
and reveal privileged communications).
294. See Green, supra note 13, at 298-300 (observing that concern for effective assistance of
counsel is only implicated if defense counsel's assistance would be useful, such as to negotiate
terms under which client will cooperate, or to advise as to how to answer questions, and arguing
that no such role is available to defense counsel in context of undercover investigations);
Schwartz, supra note 121, at 951-52 (positing that skillful negotiation and persuasive bargaining
are not present when nonattorney agent gathers information from suspect).
295. Schwartz, supra note 121, at 951-52 (arguing that "persuasion and negotiation" by
defense counsel are only implicated "in the context of direct communication between a
prosecutor and a suspect"); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 697 ("Whatever dangers flow from
the confrontation of professional guile with lay innocence are absent when two nonlawyers
communicate.").
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spoken directly with the represented person.9 6
The court of appeals in Jamil correctly reversed the broad holding
of the district court on the issue of alter egos. The text of the anti-
contact rule prohibits communication with a represented person only
when the attorney knows that the person is represented by coun-
sel.297 If an attorney will not be disciplined for directly communicat-
ing with a person whom he subsequently discovers was represented by
counsel at the time of the communication,298 it does not make sense
to discipline the prosecutor for the actions of others of which he was
unaware. 9 The anti-contact rule is designed to control the con-
duct of lawyers in communicating with represented persons, and not
the actions of persons over whom the attorney has little or no direct
control."00 If the prosecutor were disciplined for using the fruits of
an investigation in which there was contact with a represented party,
it would put an end to nearly all legitimate undercover law enforce-
ment without substantial, if any, gain to the represented suspect.30 1
296. Seefami4 707 F.2d at 646 (indicating that there may be danger that suspect would be
"'tricked' into giving his case away" through "artfully crafted questions" when nonattorney
investigator acts as alter ego for prosecutor); see also United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66
(2d Cir. 1962) (refusing to find violation of anti-contact rule because court was not faced with
"a case where defendant was in danger of being tricked by a lawyer's artfully contrived questions
into giving his case away"), rev'd on constitutional grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
297. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUGT Rule 4.2 (1983) ("[A) lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer .... " (emphasis added)).
298. See United States v. Gray, 825 F. Supp. 63, 64-65 (D. Vt. 1993) (finding that
communication was not inappropriate because prosecutor did not know suspect was
represented); WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 11.6.2 (concluding that requirement of knowledge of
representation represents goal of avoiding purposeful manipulation of represented client);
Florida State Bar Ass'n Op. No. 90-4 (July 15, 1990), available in Wesdaw, 1990 WL 446959, at
*2 ("AJustice Department attorney's knowledge that a person is represented in connection with
a particular matter is required before the rule is triggered.").
299. See, e.g., Jami4 707 F.2d at 646 ("Such a holding would bar prosecutors from utilizing
the fruits of government investigations which are found to be lawfully conducted.").
300. See id. (finding no ethical violation where prosecutor was unaware of contact with
represented person); United States v. Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)
(observing that prosecutor did not have to supervise day-to-day operations of agent, but merely
had to have supervisory authority over investigation in order for agents to be considered alter
egos under Hammad); Gray, 825 F. Supp. at 64 (observing that prosecutor did not direct agents
to contact suspect or instruct them on what information to elicit).
301. SeeJami 707 F.2d at 646 (noting that rule holding prosecutor responsible for actions
of police over which he had no control or knowledge would drastically hinder legitimate
undercover investigations); see also Green, supra note 13, at 300-05 (citing and discussing
numerous state law cases involving application of alter egos to DR 7-104(A) (1) in context of
prosecutorial responsibility for conduct of police officers).
Green argues that because police and other nonattorney law enforcement officials have an
independent authority to investigate crime, the anti-contact rule should not be applied to the
fruits of their activity. I&. at 302-03. But see United States v. McNaughton, 848 F. Supp. 1195,
1202-03 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding that anti-contact rule applied to investigator's actions
despite lack of evidence in record that investigator was working at behest or direction of
prosecutor). The court in McNaughton held that "[i]t is the government's burden to establish
that a challenged confession is admissible, however, not the burden of the defendant to show
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Courts, therefore, recognize that where the prosecutor is directing the
investigation, there may be danger to the interests of the represented
person. °2 On the other hand, the ABA should make explicit in the
commentary to the anti-contact rule that prosecutors will not be
disciplined simply for using the fruit of communication with a
represented person when there is no indication that the prosecutor
violated the ethical requirements. 3
D. Representation in the "Matter"
If a prosecutor's obligation to refrain from contact with a suspect
begins before formal criminal proceedings commence,3 0 4 it may
frequently be difficult for the prosecutor to tell if the suspect's
counsel is representing the suspect in the current investigation or in
some other matter unrelated to the investigation that the prosecutor
is directing. One concern of the Department of Justice with the
application of the anti-contact rule to federal attorneys before the
formal criminal process has begun is that it would allow career
criminals to hire "house counsel" to represent them in all criminal
matters.0 5 In Hammad, the Second Circuit also expressed particular
concern about this problem. 6 Two solutions have been suggested
to avoid unduly hampering criminal investigations into the activity of
such career criminals. First, attorneys are barred by the ethics rules
from giving counsel for the commission of a crime 6.30  Therefore,
that it is not." Id. at 1202. The court concluded that because the Government offered no
evidence that the investigator was not operating as the "alter ego" of the prosecutors "he is
therefore subject to the restrictions of the anti-communication rule to the same extent that [the
prosecutors] are." Id. at 1203.
302. See, e.g.,Jamil, 707 F.2d at 645 (recognizing that violation occurs when investigators work
as prosecutor's alter ego); United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962) (stating that
"[t]o be sure, [the anti-contact rule] would prohibit an investigator's acting as the prosecuting
attorney's alter ego"), rev'd on constitutionalgrounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp.
at 209 (observing that prosecutor did not have to supervise day-to-day operations of agent, but
merely have supervisory authority over investigation, in order for agents to be considered alter
egos under Hammad).
303. SeeTaylor, supra note 125, at 17 (suggesting that Department seek change to ethical rule
to recognize that prosecutors often must direct actions of law enforcement agents).
304. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that government
prosecutor's use of informants in preindictment, noncustodial situation may violate DR 7-
104(A) (1)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990). But see United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417,
421 (D. Md. 1994) (refusing to apply DR 7-104(A) (1) in preindictment, noncustodial setting,
and citing circuits that have also rejected rule's extension).
305. SeeThornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at492-93 (discussing burdens that contact
through "permanent counsel" would cause DOJ investigations).
306. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839 (recognizing Government's fear of criminals immunizing
themselves from infiltration by informants by hiring permanent "house counsel").
307. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 41, at 337 (noting that because ethics rules prohibit
attorneyi from advising clients with respect to commission of crime, suspect cannot be
represented by attorneywhile engaged in continuous criminal activity); see also Green, supra note
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the house attorney cannot be considered to represent a suspect
engaged in ongoing criminal activity. Second, a person is considered
represented in the matter under investigation only when the counsel
has contacted the Department or the prosecutor in charge of the
investigation, and declared his involvement in the case.308  The
Department rejected this latter suggestion out of hand, however,
because it would require ceasing all ongoing undercover operations
once the attorney for the suspect began communications with the
Government on the matter. 9 In the end, neither suggestion truly
addresses the primary concern of the Department of Justice that a
person can effectively shield himself from both overt and undercover
investigation into that person's activity by hiring a lawyer to represent
him in all matters arising with law enforcement authorities. Just
because a person is engaged in ongoing criminal activity and has
retained a lawyer does not necessarily mean that the lawyer is advising
the client to engage in that activity. Moreover, as the Department of
Justice asserts, requiring the Department attorneys to sever contact as
soon as the suspect's lawyer contacts the Department may unduly
hamper legitimate criminal investigations. In particular, in the early
stages of an investigation the prosecutor may need to be in contact
with the investigators to determine whether there is sufficient
information to seek an indictment.
There may also be a problem in determining the subject matter of
a person's representation when an individual is charged with one
crime for which he has retained counsel, but is simultaneously under
investigation for a different, unrelated crime.310 At least one State
has endorsed an interpretation of the ethics rule that makes all
contact with a person formally charged with a crime a violation of DR
7-104(A) (1), even if the law enforcement officer seeks to gain
information about an unrelated and uncharged offense. 311 The
rationale is that "discussion of the pending case undoubtedly will take
place." 12 This position, however, would effectively prevent any
further investigation into other criminal activity of a defendant once
that person has been charged with one crime, thereby placing an
unreasonable burden on law enforcement officials.
One possible solution to both the problem of "house counsel" and
13, at 308-09 (observing that Oregon State Bar ethics opinion allows communication with
represented person for purpose of thwarting future criminal activity).
308. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,985.
309. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,985.
310. See Green, supra note 13, at 305-09.
311. Green, supra note 13, at 308 (citing opinion of Oregon State Bar ethics committee).
312. Green, supra note 13, at 308.
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the problem of investigating unrelated and uncharged offenses would
be for the ABA and respective state bar associations to amend MR 4.2
to limit the term "subject matter of representation" in the criminal
context. The commentary to the ABA Model Rule could make it
explicit that a person is only represented in the subject matter when
an indictment has been handed up or the indictment is immi-
nent."'5 To avoid the possibility that the prosecutor was using
investigation of further crimes as a pretext for discovering information
about the charged offense, it would be incumbent on the prosecutor
to avoid any discussion of other charges that are pending against the
person. Furthermore, the prosecutor would have to demonstrate a
good faith effort to avoid any reference to the pending charges.
E. Waiver of Counsel by Represented Person
The Department ofJustice concedes the dangers posed, even in the
preindictment stages, by overt contact with a suspect absent the
consent of the person's counsel.314 The Department has prohibited
four categories of overt communications in the preindictment
stages.315 Nonetheless, these restrictions are inadequate because the
regulation authorizes direct, overt contact with a represented person
313. See Florida State Bar Ass'n Op. No. 90-4 (July 15, 1990), available in Westlaw, 1990 WL
446959, at *2 (suggesting that concept of general counsel be limited to civil context, and that
ethics rule should apply only when suspect specifically refers matter of investigation to attorney);
see also Communication With Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,098-99 (recognizing
restrictions on overt communications with target of investigation (citing U.S. ATrORNEYS'
MANUAL §§ 9-13.240 to .241)). Although previous versions of the Department's regulations did
not contain any restrictions on contact with targets of an investigation, the current version still
falls short of the dictates of the ethical rule. First, the restrictions on communications with
targets appear in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, not directly in the regulation. Id. Second, and
more importantly, the restrictions only apply to overt communications. Id. Furthermore, even
the restrictions on overt communications are insufficient because they allow contact when the
target initiates the communications. See infra Part III.E.1 (discussing dangers of situation where
suspect initiates communications with government attorney).
314. Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,088.
315. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., §§ 77.8 to .9. The four
categories are: (1) communications intended to discourage attorney consultation, id.
§ 77.9(a) (ii); (2) communications intended to elicit lawful defense strategy or legal arguments
of counsel, id. § 77.9(a) (i); (3) communications for the purpose of negotiating or concluding
a plea agreement or settlement, id. § 77.8; and (4) communications which improperly seek to
disrupt the attorney-client relationship, id. § 77.9(a) (iii). The proposed regulation contains a
further protection for the attorney-client negotiations in that it prohibits a prosecutor from
directing an agent or informant to participate in attorney-client meetings or communications.
Id. § 77.9(b). Furthermore, when an agent or informant is requested to participate in an
attorney-client meeting, and the agent or informant must participate in order to protect his or
her own safety or the confidentiality of the undercover investigation, the regulation requires the
erection of "chinese walls." Id. In other words, the agent or witness cannot relay the content
of the attorney-client meeting to any of the attorneys who are directly involved in the
prosecution. Id. The content of the attorney-client meeting may also not be used to the
detriment of the client. Id.
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in two situations in which the ethical rule would most likely prohibit
such communications.
1. Initiation of communications by represented person
One of the areas of overt communications with represented persons
that the regulation would permit is when the represented person
initiates the contact and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waives the presence of counsel." 6 Although this position is in
conformity with Fifth and Sixth Amendment precedent,1 7 it miscon-
ceives the goal of DR 7-104(A) (1). Many courts recognize that ethical
standards are applicable against the attorney and may not be waived
by the client. 18
Among the goals advanced by DR 7-104(A) (1) is the ability of an
attorney to assure that his client does not squander any viable
defenses or make rash decisions without fully comprehending the
legal implications. 9 The rule also prohibits contact with a repre-
sented person so that an attorney may not use his or her training to
elicit concessions that are damaging to the represented person's
case. 2' Even if a party knowingly and voluntarily wishes to speak to
316. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6(c)(1); see also
Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,098 (permitting contact with
target when target initiates contact (citing U.S. A'roRNE'S' MANUAL § 9-13.241(c) (1994))).
317. Green, supra note 13, at 310 (explaining that contact with represented person in
absence of counsel is in conformity with Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing that ethical
provisions deal with "duties of attorneys, not with the sights of parties," and therefore cannot be
waived); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.) (holding that defendant cannot
waive his application of ethics rules), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); People v. Green, 274
N.W.2d 448, 453 (Mich. 1979) (stating that willingness of defendant to communicate with
prosecutor may be considered as mitigating factor, but does not excuse ethical violation). But
see Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 688-90 (arguing that client is often better qualified to determine
when it is appropriate to meet directly with opposing counsel).
319. United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that rule is
designed to protect clients from losing claims, defenses, or disclosing privileged information),
rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 686 (listing
purported goals and dangers sought to be addressed by DR 7-104(A) (1)).
320. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 11.6.2 (discussing various goals of rule); see also HAZARD
& HODES, supra note 109, § 4.2:101 ("In tandem with Rule 4.3.... [Rule 4.2] prevents a lawyer
from taking advantage of a lay person to secure admissions against interest or to achieve
unconscionable settlement of a dispute."); Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 686 (stating that anti-
contact rule is intended to address "danger that lawyers will bamboozle parties unprotected by
their own counsel"). Even the Department ofJustice recognizes that "the prosecutor's superior
legal training and specialized knowledge could be used to the detriment of the untutored
layperson." Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 111, at 10,088; see also
Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,910-11 (noting that
it is generally unfair for attorney to circumvent opposing counsel and employ superior skills and
legal training to take advantage of opposing party).
Leubsdorf lists other frequently cited reasons justifying the rule as: avoiding the danger that
the'lawyer will have to become a witness because of a disagreement between the lawyer and
opposing party over what was said at the meeting- helping clients avoid disclosing privileged
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a prosecutor without his lawyer present, the prosecutor is under an
obligation not to speak with the person because the prosecutor may
consciously or unconsciously use his or her skills to the represented
party's disadvantage.321 When a person has an attorney present for
advice, the suspect's attorney can ensure that the opposing counsel
neither knowingly nor unwittingly uses his skills to the disadvantage
of the suspect. Furthermore, although the client has the ultimate
choice about the direction of his or her case,322 the comments to
the ethical rules recognize that the attorney has significant control
over questions of strategy.323 If government attorneys are allowed
to communicate with a represented person without the knowledge or
consent of that person's attorney, the uncounseled client may
"squander[] a possible claim or defense" or "disclos[e] privileged
information."324
This does not mean that when a person waives his right to counsel
altogether, the prosecutor is prohibited from communicating with the
defendant. DR 7-104 (A) (1) explicitly applies only to communications
where the suspect is already represented by counsel."s
information; using lawyers as disinterested experts to aid in the settlement of disputes; and
avoiding the conflict lawyers face between their duty to represent their client most effectively
and their duty to avoid contact with the opposing party. Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 686-87.
321. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that despite
initiation of contact by defendant, prosecutors' refusal to abstain from communication weakened
attorney-client relationship and "'tilted the delicate balance of [the adversarial] process'"
(quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 259 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Feinberg, CJ., dissenting), cet. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986))); United States v. Guerrerio, 675
F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "the prohibition on direct contact with a
represented party is required by the perceived imbalance of legal skill and acumen between an
attorney and a layman. Without such a rule, an unscrupulous attorney might unfairly take
advantage of an unsophisticated party." (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 211
(1964) (WhiteJ, dissenting))); Freyv. Department of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32,
34 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (identifying goal of anti-contact rule as preventing counsel from taking
advantage of adverse party); United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(discussing "societal interests" served by adherence to anti-contact rule even in criminal law
enforcement context).
322. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.2 (1983) (requiring an attorney
to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation").
323. See id. Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 (noting that "the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical
and legal tactical issues"); id. Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (stating that "a lawyer is not bound to press for
every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in
determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.").
324. United States v.Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), reu'd on other grounds, 707
F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
325. See DR 7-104(A) (1) (prohibiting lawyer from communicating with person, who he
"knows to be represented by a lawyer") (emphasis added); MR 4.2 (same); see also Green, supra note
13, at 310 (noting that DR 7-104(A) (1)'s goal of effective assistance of counsel is not implicated
when suspect has waived counsel); WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 11.6.2 (noting that when opposing
counsel does not know of representation, or person does not have representation, there can be
no danger that attorney seeking direct contact with party is denying party effective assistance of
counsel). The denial of effective assistance of counsel can occur in two ways. Id. First, the
opposing counsel can knowingly circumvent the party's attorney in an effort to get concessions
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There may be legitimate reasons for the represented party to meet
with the prosecutor in the absence of counsel. Perhaps the most
straight-forward reason occurs when a third party pays for the
attorney, and the represented person does not feel that the counsel
is pursuing his interests,"' as occurred in United States v. Lopez.
327
The AUSA, under the belief that Lopez or his family was in danger,
sought outjudicial approval for a meeting with Lopez in the absence
of, and without the consent or knowledge of, his lawyer.3 28  The
Ninth Circuit held that the court has the authority to except the
meeting from the requirements of the anti-contact rule.329
The Department's regulation requires that a government attorney
seek judicial approval of overt communications when a represented
party waives the presence of his counsel.30 Although the regulation
while the person lacks legal advice. Id. Second, if the party's attorney finds out about the
contact, the attorney might be injured by what the attorney may perceive as his client's
dissatisfaction with his services. Id. § 11.6.2 n.31. As a result, the client will not receive effective
assistance of counsel. Id. These concerns are not present when a person has waived his right
to counsel altogether. But see Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 694 (criticizing anti-contact rule for
not protecting unrepresented persons from contact with opposing counsel).
The Supreme Court has guaranteed a person's right to self-representation. Farretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (finding that denial of defendant's right to defend himself
during prosecution for grand theft is violation of Sixth Amendment). The Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Lopz, did not find a conflict between enforcement of DR 7-104 and the
constitutional right to self-representation where the party knowingly and voluntarily spoke with
the prosecutor. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993). The court reasoned
that so long as the party retained his counsel in the matter, the goals of DR 7-104(A) (1) would
be undermined if the party was allowed to exonerate the prosecutor by "waiving" the application
of the anti-contact rule. Id. Furthermore, Rule 4.3 provides limited protections to unrepresent-
ed persons from overreaching attorneys. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 4.3;
see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 109, § 4.2:101 (stating that MR 4.3 works in connection
with MR 4.2 to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of unrepresented laypersons).
326. SeeThornburgh Memorandum, supra note 59, at 492 (outlining two scenarios in which
it would be beneficial for represented person to meet with prosecutor in absence of his
attorney). The first scenario is in the corporate setting where a corporate counsel allegedly
represents all the employees, but one employee wishes to turn state's evidence. Id. The second
situation involves organized crime, where the crime boss provides counsel for all organization
members, but a member wishes to cooperate with the authorities and fears for his safety if he
tells his lawyer that he plans to meet with the prosecutor to work out a deal. Id.
327. 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra Part I.C.1 (setting out detailed discussion of
facts and holdings in Lopez).
328. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993).
329. Id. The AUSA, however, withheld from the magistrate the fact that Lopez' attorney told
him that there was no danger to Lopez or Lopez' family. Id. at 1462. The Second Circuit,
therefore, held that the magistrate had not ratified the meeting because she could not make an
informed decision about authorizing the communications. Id.
330. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6(c) (2) (requiringjudicia
approval); see also Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at
39,920-21 (discussing scope ofjudicial inquiry when court grants approval). Prior versions of
the Department's regulation did not contain the requirement of judicial approval. See
Communications with Represented Persons, supra note 21, at 39,987 (noting that judicial
approval is not required, but that U.S. Attornes'Manual suggests judicial approval as matter of
good policy).
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is a step in the right direction, it does not go far enough. The
Department's regulation only requires that the judge determine
whether the waiver of counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily."3' The commentary to the regulation specifically rejects
the requirement that the judge determine if there is "some overriding
justification" for the client to communicate with the Government in
the absence of his or her counsel.3 2
This procedure does not seem to comport with United States v. Lopm
In that case, the information withheld by the prosecutor did not go
to the knowing, intelligent, or voluntary nature of Lopez' communica-
tions, but rather, the withheld information concerned thejustification
for the meeting.33  The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
consideration of whether the magistrate had "made an informed
decision to authorize the communications. "3' Therefore, Lopez
stands for the proposition that there needs to be somejustification for
a meeting between the government attorney and the client in the
absence of the client's attorney.
2. Waiver of right to counsel upon arrest
The most recent version of the Department's regulation authorizes
government attorneys to speak with a suspect at the time of his arrest
if he waives his right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.3 3 5 If the defendant waives his constitutional right to have his
counsel present at the time of arrest the new regulation does not
require judicial approval for the communication. 36 The Depart-
ment does not adequately justify the distinction between communica-
tions at the time of arrest and communications initiated by the
represented person at another point, noting only that "the constitu-
tional protections established in that decisional law adequately protect
represented individuals following arrest."3 37  While this interpreta-
tion may be accurate, the anti-contact rule is intended to provide
more protection to a suspect than the constitutional right to counsel.3 '
331. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6(c) (2).
332. See Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,921.
333. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1462.
334. Id.
335. See Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.6(d); see also
Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,921-22 (noting that
these constitutional protections adequately protect represented individuals after arrest).
336. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,921.
337. Communications with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,921.
338. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990). The Second Circuit wrote:
[T] he Constitution prescribes a floor below which the protections may not fall, rather
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E Remedies for Violation of Anti-Contact Rule
Violations of the Department ofJustice's regulation are to be dealt
with primarily as a matter of internal discipline."3 9 The new regula-
tion, however, contains a provision not included in earlier drafts.
Apparently in a concession to the interests of States in attorney
discipline, the regulation does allow for limited state involvement, °
permitting state disciplinary proceedings to take place only when the
U.S. Attorney General has determined that a government attorney has
willfully violated the Department's regulation."1 But, because the
Attorney General's determination concerning violations of the
regulation is "final and conclusive," States are completely preempted
from enforcing their version of the anti-contact rule without consent
of the U.S. Attorney General. 42
Furthermore, the regulation contains no provision regarding the
ability of federal courts to discipline government attorneys for
violating their local rules. As discussed above, this position is
inconsistent with both the inherent supervisory powers of the federal
courts and the concept of federalism.' Because the enforcement
than a ceiling beyond which they may not rise.... The Code is designed to safeguard
the integrity of the profession and preserve public confidence in our system ofjustice.
It not only delineates an attorney's duties to the court, but defines his relationship with
his client and adverse parties. Hence, the Code secures protections not contemplated
by the Constitution.
Id. at 839; see also United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.) (finding that despite
valid Miranda-type waiver, prosecutor violated rules of professional ethics by communicating with
defendant without his counsel present because stricture of canons of ethics "is obviously not
something which the defendant alone can waive"), cert. denied 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United
States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th Cir.) ("emphatically reiterat[ing]" proposition that
in-custody interrogation of represented suspect violates rules of ethics), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947
(1970); People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 452-54 (Mich. 1979) (holding that prosecutor may
violate anti-contact rule even though defendant properly waived his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel). But see State v. Decker, 641 A.2d 226, 230 (N.H. 1994) ("We need not determine
whether an ethical violation occurred, because we hold that suppression of a confession is not
warranted absent a violation of the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.").
339. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.11 (establishing that
"Attorney General shall have exclusive jurisdiction over this part and any violations of it"). The
commentary observes that the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility has "sole
original" jurisdiction to investigate violations of the regulation. Communications with
Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,926. Furthermore, the commentary notes
that the Attorney General's determination concerning a violation of the regulation 'shall be
final and conclusive." Id.
340. Communications with Represented Persons, infraapp., § 77.12; see also Communications
with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,927 (noting that regulation
completely preempts state law with only this exception).
341. Communications with Represented Persons, infra app., § 77.12.
342. Communications with Represented Persons, infraapp., § 77.12; see also Communications
with Represented Persons Commentary, supra note 2, at 39,927 (discussing preemptive effect of
new regulation).
343. See supra Part I.
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of the ethics provisions properly should remain with the federal courts
and state ethics commissions, the question remains as to the appropri-
ate remedies available to rectify violations of DR 7-104(A) (1).
Most federal courts have rejected suppression of evidence, dismissal
of indictment, and reversal of conviction as inappropriate to address
the concerns of anti-contact ethics violations. 44 The Ninth Circuit
in Lopez, for example, reversed the lower court's remedy of dismissing
an indictment.345 The Ninth Circuit's analysis is particularly compel-
ling:
We are sensitive to the district court's concerns that none of the
alternative sanctions available to it are as certain to impress the
government with our resoluteness in holding prosecutors to the
ethical standards which regulate the legal profession as a whole. At
the same time, we are confident that, when there is no showing of
substantial prejudice to the defendant, lesser sanctions, such as
holding the prosecutor in contempt or referral to the state bar for
disciplinary proceedings, can be adequate to discipline and punish
government attorneys who attempt to circumvent the standards of
their profession. 6
When there is substantial prejudice to the defendant, the contact
may no longer be a simple ethics violation but may rise to the level
of a violation of the defendant's due process rights. 47 A district
court in United States v. Guerrerioa concluded that excluding the
acquired evidence is particularly appropriate when constitutional
rights are at stake because of the lack of an otherwise effective
remedy.3 49  That court concluded, however, that the "discipline of
344. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
dismissal of indictment was not justified); United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir.
1993) (concluding that absent willful government misconduct, suppression is unwarranted);
United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that attorney disciplinary
proceedings and not limitation of cross-examination would be appropriate remedy for violation
of DR 7-104); United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that violation
by AUSA of DR 7-104 was not reversible error), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980); People v.
Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979) (observing that reversal of conviction "constitute[s]
reprehensible 'overkill'"). But see United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988)
(observing that use of supervisory power to exclude evidence is warranted to deter further
misconduct, maintain judicial integrity, and maintain popular trust in judicial process), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
345. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464, rev k 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
346. Id.
347. See, e.g., Green, 274 N.W.2d at 455 (analyzing prosecutor's conduct to determine whether
it "was so fundamentally unfair and shocking to the sensibilities of reasonable persons that it
rises to the level of a violation of due process of law"). The court in Green determined that
despite the ethical violation, the prosecutor's conduct was "relatively innocuous." Id.
348. 675 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
349. United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that
exclusionary rule is necessary to deter unconstitutional conduct because individual punishment
is impractical).
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attorneys has traditionally been a matter uniquely the province of
local authorities,"5 0 and that such a local forum provides an ade-
quate remedy for the violation of ethics provisions.
35 1
Violations of ethics rules should never be used as a basis for the
exclusion of evidence, dismissal of indictments, or reversal of
convictions, 5 2 unless the violation rises to the level of a constitution-
al violation. 53 The exclusionary rule is appropriate to remedy
constitutional violations because personal rights are involved. 4
Ethics rules, on the other hand, do not create personal rights in a
defendant,5 5 but instead are intended to regulate the conduct of
attorneys in the judicial process. 56 The public would be penalized
350. Id. at 1435.
351. Id. The ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct requires that when ajudge becomes aware that
an attorney has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, she must refer the matter to the
appropriate authority. SeeABA CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDuCr Canon 3D(2) (1990). The Code
defines "appropriate authority" as the body responsible "for initiation of disciplinary process with
respect to the violation to be reported." Id. (Terminology). As of 1988, the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct had been adopted in 47 States, the District of Columbia, and by the Federal
Judicial Conference. See Steven Lubet, Regulation ofJudges' Business and Financial Activities, 37
EMORY L.J. 1, 1 n.1 (1988) (discussing acceptance of Code in United States).
352. See United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that disciplinary
action, and not limitation of cross-examination, would be proper method for sanctioning
violation of MR 4.2); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal or Discipline?, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHics 1083, 1100-01 (1994) (arguing that
discipline and not dismissal or exclusion is appropriate remedy for violation of ethics rules by
prosecutors); Schwartz, supra note 121, at 954-57 (providing persuasive arguments for
prohibiting exclusion of evidence, dismissal, or reversal as remedies for violation of DR 7-
104(A) (1)).
353. See United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336, 347 (D.D.C. 1990) (refusing to depart
from sentencing guidelines for violation of MR 4.2 where conduct neither affected fair trial nor
was "entrenched or longstanding"); see also supra Part II.B (discussing scope of courts' inherent
supervisory authority); cf United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1983) (holding that
while courts have power not granted by Constitution or statute to reverse convictions because
of wrongs committed duringjudicial process, power of reversal may not be exercised in absence
of harmful error).
354. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980) (barring use of supervisory
powers to exclude evidence taken in violation of third party's Fourth Amendment right but not
in violation of defendant's constitutional rights); Schwartz, supra note 121, at 955-56
(distinguishing violation of constitutional rights and violation of ethical rules).
355. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that ethical
rules are "fundamentally concerned with the duties of attorneys, not with the rights of parties");
United States v. McNaughton, 848 F. Supp. 1195,1204 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that suppression
of evidence is not appropriate remedy for ethics violation).
The court in McNaugton further held that "[tihe Code of Professional Responsibility is not
enforced under the constitutional exclusionary rule, but only under a federal court's general
supervisory powers which are subject to the control of Congress." Id. The court concluded that
the court's inherent supervisory power was limited by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, which provides that "'[i]f the trial judge determines that the confession was
voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a) (1988));
see also People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979) (observing that unlike constitutional
and statutory rights, ethical rules do not provide guarantees to individual persons).
356. See Green, 274 N.W.2d at 454 (discussing purpose of ethical rules). The court in Green
stated:
The provisions of the [ethics] code are not constitutional or statutory rights guaranteed
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for the misconduct of an individual attorney by allowing an otherwise
guilty person to go free.357 By taking action against the individual
prosecutor, the proper deterrent value is achieved without the cost to
the criminal justice system."' In order to be effective, disciplinary
proceedings must be conducted by independent tribunals, such as
state disciplinary boards, and not through internal Department of
Justice proceedings. 59
to individual persons. They are instead self-imposed internal regulations prescribing
the standards of conduct for members of the bar. Although it is true that the principle
purpose of many provisions is the protection of the public, the remedy for a violation
has traditionally been internal bar disciplinary action against the offending attorney.
The sanctions available are by no means trivial. The attorney faces permanent
disbarment. In these respects the provisions of the code are no different from the
provisions found in the codes of conduct for other professions, such as medicine or
architecture. They are all self-governing in-house regulations.
Id.; see also State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Kan. 1982) (holding that Rules of Professional
Conduct govern behavior of lawyers and are unrelated to admission of evidence); Stringer v.
State, 372 So. 2d 378, 383 (Ala. Crim. App.) (holding that admission of evidence is governed
only by statutory and constitutional rules, not rules of professional conduct (citing Green, 274
N.W.2d 448 (Mich. 1979)), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 384 (Ala. 1979)).
357. Cf Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (holding that violation of Fourth
Amendment is not cognizable claim in habeas corpus proceedings). The Court in Stone
reasoned that the evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was highly probative
on the issue of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 485, 490. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the
cost of reversing the conviction outweighed the deterrent benefit of a reversal. Id. at 489-95.
This reasoning is equally applicable in situations with ethical violations. Statements obtained
in conformity with the constitutional protections, and even those that are obtained unconstitu-
tionally, may be highly probative. Id. at 490. The costs of excluding such reliable evidence
outweigh the benefits, especially where deterrence of unethical prosecutorial conduct can be
accomplished in state disciplinary proceedings. See Green, 274 N.W.2d at 455 (noting that
disciplinary proceeding would afford greater deterrent effect than exclusionary rule because
exclusionary rule is only indirect sanction of attorney's conduct).
358. See In reAtwell, 115 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (reprimanding attorney for
violating anti-contact rule; explaining, "It is hoped that this public reproof will have the effect
of deterring you from further conduct of this sort, and that it will have the effect upon others
who might be forgetful, as you have been, to deter them."); Morton, supra note 352, at 1115-16
(concluding that attorney discipline provides sufficient deterrent); Schwartz, supra note 121, at
956-57 (reasoning that attorney discipline provides more effective deterrent than suppression
of evidence).
359. A recent student Note has concluded that internal policing of ethics violations by the
Department ofJustice Office of Professional Responsibility is ineffective. Morton, supra note
344, at 1109-10. The most significant problem with internal policing is the Department's
extremely poor track record in taking any action against the prosecutor. Id. at 1109 (citing
examples in which DOJ took no disciplinary action despite federal judges' reprimands of
prosecutors); see also H.R REP. No. 986, supra note 155, at 35 (expressing concern about
Department's efforts on self-policing because such efforts "are much like the fox guarding the
chicken coop"); Taylor, supra note 125, at 30 (citing several examples where Department took
no action against patently unethical conduct of prosecutor). Moreover, when the Department
ofJustice disagrees with the application of interpretation of an ethical rule, it can refuse to find
an ethical violation by the prosecutor, thereby effectively preempting the traditional role of
States and federal courts as bodies that define professional conduct of attorneys. Morton, supra
note 352, at 1114 ("States which admit attorneys to practice under their laws must be able to
maintain concurrent jurisdiction over federal prosecutors. Without this check on the
Department ofJustice, there are few realistic limits on federal prosecutorial misconduct when
the Department ofJustice finds itself in disagreement with state ethical rules.").
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CONCLUSION
In some respects, the Department of Justice is correct in its
assertion that there is a need to change the current anti-contact rule
in its application to federal law enforcement."6 Indeed, perhaps the
rule is even unsuitable with regard to state prosecutors as well. 61
The Department's heavy-handed approach is, however, an inappropri-
ate response to a problem that must be solved with input from all
members of the legal profession who are affected by the rule.
62
Not only does the new regulation disregard many of the important
goals sought to be advanced by the anti-contact rule, it also elevates
the objectives of efficient law enforcement and prosecutorial oversight
of criminal investigations over the goal of effective, unhindered
representation without first getting a consensus among all attorneys
affected by the regulation.
Furthermore, the Department of Justice ignores the important
interests of the States in regulating the attorneys licensed to practice
in their jurisdiction, and of the courts to supervise the conduct of the
officers of the court..63  On the other hand, the ABA and the
respective state ethics tribunals need to recognize the need for
,legitimate law enforcement, especially what is perhaps the most
effective investigative tool, undercover agents and informants.3"
By amending the anti-contact rule to clarify when a person is
represented in the subject matter of the communication, and by
explicitly recognizing that prosecutors cannot be held responsible for
the actions of others where the prosecutor had no knowledge of those
360. Cf. United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813-14 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (positing that
"[t]here may well be good reason for modifying Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) (1)").
361. See Norton, supra note 39, at 207 (noting that state prosecutors are attempting to ride
coattails of Department ofJustice's effort to exempt federal prosecutors from anti-contact rule).
362. See Solution for Prosecutorial Contacts, supra note 109, at 302 (observing need for
cooperation between ABA and DOJ because "[r]ule-making is 'symbolically the wrong place' for
[Attorney General] Reno to begin addressing the issue.... The rule proposed in November
1992 was 'drafted without our input in a sort of last expression of hubris [by the Bush
administration].'") (quoting Donald E. Santarelli, ABA Criminal justice Section).
363. See Solution for Prosecutorial Contacts, supra note 109, at 304 (observing that DOJ's
assumption of oversight of prosecutorial ethics upsets current, well-established scheme).
Perhaps the most serious [flaw] is the proposed rule's assumption that the Attorney
General can definitively regulate the professional ethical conduct ofJustice Department
lawyers, without the various State supreme courts which admitted these lawyers to
practice having continuing jurisdiction over them with regard to their conduct as
federal Justice Department employees.
Id. (quoting Sam Dash, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
364. See United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that prosecutor did not
intend to "forego one of its 'most effective law enforcement techniques for investigating
complex crime'" by promising to direct all interviews with suspect through his attorney (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993))).
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actions, the ethical rule would not unduly hinder legitimate law
enforcement techniques prior to and even after indictment. 65
Furthermore, such amendments would not risk the interests of the
person represented by counsel by preventing the prosecutor from
manipulating a represented person either directly or through alter
egos.
365. See Solution for Prosecutorial Contacts, supra note 109, at 303 (listing options for possible
compromise without issuance of federal regulation, including ABA ethics opinion, revision of
MR 4.2, and reworking commentary to anti-contact rule).
Other suggested options include congressional legislation, application to judicial officer for
approval for contact, or appointment of a special prosecutor. Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 125,
at 17 (suggesting several amendments to anti-contact rule thatwould protect prosecutors without
preempting entire field).
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APPENDIX
Part 77-COMMUNICATIONS WITH REPRESENTED PERSONS
§ 77.1 PURPOSE AND AUTHORny.
(a) The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that its
attorneys perform their duties in accordance with the highest ethical
standards. The purpose of this part is to provide a comprehensive,
clear, and uniform set of rules governing the circumstances under
which Department of Justice attorneys may communicate or cause
others to communicate with persons known to be represented by
counsel in the course of law enforcement investigations and proceed-
ings. This part ensures the Department's ability to enforce federal law
effectively and ethically, consistent with the principles underlying Rule
4.2 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, while eliminating the uncertainty and confusion arising
from the variety of interpretations given to the rule and analogous
rules by state and federal courts and by bar association organizations
and committees....
§ 77.3 REPRESENTED PARTY; REPRESENTED PERSON.
(a) A person shall be considered a "represented party" within the
meaning of this part only if all three of the following circumstances
exist:
(1) The person has retained counsel or accepted counsel by
appointment or otherwise;
(2) The representation is ongoing and concerns the subject matter
in question;
(3) The person has been arrested or charged in a federal criminal
case or is a defendant in a civil law enforcement proceeding concern-
ing the subject matter of the representation.
(b) A person shall be considered a "represented person" within the
meaning of this part if circumstances set forth in paragraphs (a) (1)
and (2) of this section exist, but the circumstance set forth in
paragraph (a) (3) of this section does not exist.
§ 77.4 CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LIMITATIONS.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, any communica-
tion that is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by
any other provision of the United States Constitution, by any federal
statute, by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C. App.)
or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C. App.) shall be
likewise prohibited under this part.
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§ 77.5 GENERAL RULE FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT;
REPRESENTED PARTIES.
Except as provided in this part or as otherwise authorized by law,
an attorney for the government may not communicate, or cause
another to communicate, with a represented party who the attorney
for the government knows is represented by an attorney concerning
the subject matter of the representation without the consent of the
lawyer representing such party.
§ 77.6 EXCEPTIONS; REPRESENTED PARTIES.
An attorney for the government may communicate, or cause
another to communicate, with a represented party without the
consent of the lawyer representing such party concerning the subject
matter of the representation if one or more of the following
circumstances exist:
(a) Determination if representation exists. The communication is to
determine if the person is in fact represented by counsel concerning
the subject matter of the investigation or proceeding.
(c) Initiation of communication by represented party. The represented
party initiates the communication directly with the attorney for the
government or through an intermediary and:
(1) Prior to the commencement of substantive discussions on the
subject matter of the representation and after being advised by the
attorney for the government of the client's right to speak through his
or her attorney and/or to have the client's attorney present for the
communication, manifests that his or her waiver of counsel for the
communication is voluntary, knowing and informed and, if willing to
do, signs a written statement to this effect; and
(2) A federal district judge, magistrate judge or other court of
competentjurisdiction has concluded that the represented party has:
(i) Waived the presence of counsel and that such waiver is
voluntary, knowing, and informed; or
(ii) Obtained substitute counsel or has received substitute counsel
by court appointment, and substitute counsel has consented to the
communication.
(d) Waivers at the time of arrest. The communication is made at the
time of the arrest of the represented party and he or she is advised of
his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and
voluntarily and knowingly waives them.
(e) Investigation of additional, different or ongoing crimes or civil
violations. The communication is made in the course of an investiga-
tion, whether undercover or overt, of additional, different or ongoing
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criminal activity or other unlawful conduct ...
(f) Threat to safety or life. The attorney for the government in good
faith believes that there may be a threat to the safety or life of any
person; the purpose of the communication is to obtain or provide
information to protect against the risk of injury or death; and the
attorney for the government in good faith believes that the communi-
cation is necessary to protect against such risk.
§ 77.7 REPRESENTED PERSONS; INVESTIGATIONS.
Except as otherwise provided in this part, an attorney for the
government may communicate, or cause another to communicate,
with a represented person in the process of conducting an investiga-
tion, including, but not limited to, an undercover investigation.
§ 77.8 REPRESENTED PERSONS AND REPRESENTED PARTIES; PLEA
NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL AGREEMENTS.
An attorney for the government may not initiate or engage in
negotiations of a plea agreement, settlement, statutory or non-
statutory immunity agreement, or other disposition of actual or
potential criminal charges or civil enforcement claims, or sentences
or penalties with a represented person or represented party who the
attorney for the government knows is represented by an attorney
without the consent of the attorney representing such person or party;
provided, however, that this restriction will not apply if the communi-
cation satisfies § 77.6(c).
§ 77.9 REPRESENTED PERSONS AND REPRESENTED PARTIES; RESPECT FOR
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS.
When an attorney for the government communicates, or causes a
law enforcement agent or cooperating witness to communicate, with
a represented person or represented party pursuant to any provision
of these regulations without consent of counsel, the following
restrictions must be observed:
(a) Deference to attorney-client relationship. (1) An attorney for the
government, or anyone acting at his or her direction may not, when
communicating with a represented person or represented party:
(i) Inquire about information regarding lawful defense strategy or
legal arguments of counsel;
(ii) Disparage counsel for a represented person or represented
party or otherwise seek to induce the person to forego representation
or to disregard the advice of the person's attorney; or
(iii) Otherwise improperly seek to disrupt the relationship between
the represented person or represented party and counsel.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) (1) of this section, if the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate
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Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General or a United States
Attorney finds that there is a substantial likelihood that there exists
a significant conflict of interest between a represented person or party
and his or her attorney; and that it is not feasible to obtain a judicial
order challenging the representation, then an attorney for the
government with prior written authorization from an official
identified above may apprise the person of the nature of the
perceived conflict of interest, unless the exigencies of the situation
permit only prior oral authorization, in which case such oral
authorization shall be memorialized in writing as soon thereafter as
possible.
(b) Attorney-client meetings. An attorney for the government may not
direct or cause an undercover law enforcement agent or cooperating
witness to attend or participate in lawful attorney-client meetings or
communications, except when the agent or witness is requested to do
so by the represented person or party, defense counsel, or another
person affiliated or associated with the defense, and when reasonably
necessary to protect the safety of the agent or witness or the confiden-
tiality of an undercover operation. If the agent or witness attends or
participates in such meetings, any information regarding lawful
defense strategy or trial preparation imparted to the agent or witness
shall not be communicated to attorneys for the government or to law
enforcement agents who are directly participating in the ongoing
investigation or in the prosecution of pending criminal charges, or
used in any other way to the substantial detriment of the client.
§ 77.11 ENFORCEMENT OF THIS PART.
(a) Exclusive enforcement ly Attorney General. The Attorney General
shall have exclusive authority over this part and any violations of it,
except as provided in § 77.12. Allegations of violations of this part
shall be reviewed exclusively by the Office of Professional Responsibili-
ty of the Department of Justice, and shall be addressed when
appropriate as matters of attorney discipline by the Department....
The findings of the Attorney General or her designees as to an
attorney's compliance or non-compliance with this part shall be final
and conclusive except insofar as the attorney for the government is
afforded a right of review by other provisions of law.
(b) No private remedies. This part is not intended to and does not
create substantive rights on behalf of criminal or civil defendants,
targets or subjects of investigations, witnesses, counsel for represented
parties or represented persons, or any other person other than an
attorney for the government, and shall not be a basis for dismissing
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criminal or civil charges or proceedings against represented parties or
for excluding relevant evidence in any proceeding in any court of the
United States.
§ 77.12 RELATIONSHIP TO STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION.
Communications with represented parties and represented persons
pursuant to this part are intended to constitute communications that
are "authorized by law" within the meaning of Rule 4.2 of the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, DR
7-104(A) (1) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, and
analogous state and federal court rules. In addition, this part is
intended to preempt and supersede the application of state laws and
rules and local federal court rules to the extent that they relate to
contacts by attorneys for the government, and those acting at their
direction or under their supervision, with represented parties or
represented persons in criminal or civil law enforcement investigations
or proceedings; it is designed to preempt the entire field of rules
concerning such contacts. When the Attorney General finds a willful
violation of any of the rules in this part, however, sanctions for the
conduct that constituted a willful violation of this part may be applied,
if warranted, by the appropriate state disciplinary authority.
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